Annex 5: Public Comments

Canada

Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers
Sheila Greckol, Jeffrey Sack, Claude Melançon

Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers (CALL)

1. The Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers is a national organization of 250 lawyers representing workers and trade unions across Canada. CALL has members and elected representatives from every region of the country and is active in education, legislative and administrative advocacy, and numerous other activities aimed at protecting and advancing the rights of workers and basic trade union freedoms. CALL was co-sponsor and co-chair of a Canada-Mexico Conference on the NAALC, held in Mexico in January 1996, and has co-sponsored and co-chaired a Canada-Chile Conference, held in Chile in April 1998, on the protection of workers' rights and co-operation under hemispheric trade treaties, with particular reference to promoting compliance and co-operative activities under the NAALC. Both of these conferences have involved support and participation from government, labour and business, as well from lawyers representing unions and employers.

The Promise of the NAALC

2. The promise of the NAALC is substantial. Its preamble calls, among other things, for protecting, enhancing and enforcing basic workers' rights; strengthening labour-management co-operation; promoting higher living standards; and encouraging compliance with labour laws and co-operation in maintaining a progressive, fair, safe and healthy working environment. The objectives of the NAALC include the improvement of working conditions and living standards; the promotion of basic labour principles (the first of eleven being freedom of association and the right to organize); and the promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, labour laws. The obligations under the NAALC require that each government ensure that its labour laws provide for high labour standards (Article 2), promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labour laws (Article 3), and ensure access to tribunals through proceedings that are fair, equitable and transparent (Articles 4 and 5).

3. The essence of a trade agreement is to make it easier for companies to do business free of the constraints of national regulation. In order to ensure that this is not achieved at the expense of labour standards - through "social dumping", "downward harmonization of labour laws", and a "race to the bottom" - the goal must be "fair trade" - trade that is accompanied by high labour standards, enforcement of basic labour rights, and compliance with the rule of law. This is the promise of the NAALC, and the expectation of workers in the countries whose governments are parties to it. At the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Secretaries of Labour of the United States and Mexico and Canada's Labour Minister on September 18, 1997, U.S. Secretary of Labour, Alexis M. Herman, confirmed this intention. "President Clinton and I are committed to protecting worker rights in North America," Secretary Herman said.

The Experience under the NAALC

4. Regrettably, the promise of the NAALC has been belied by the experience under it. The events of the past four years demonstrate that the NAALC is seriously flawed, and has achieved little of its original promise.

5. What is the experience of the past four years? Again and again, in cases involving different companies - General Electric, Honeywell, Sony, Spring, Han, and Echlin - the basic rights of workers to organize unions of their choice have been frustrated by unfair labour practices on the part of trans-national corporations - such as plant closure, mass firings, rigged elections, violence and intimidation - and by the failure of some governments and governmental agencies to deal impartially and effectively with flagrant anti-union conduct.

6. Practices which stand out as particularly offensive are:

• the absence of secret ballots in union representation votes.
• the operation of "exclusion clauses" that allow workers to be fired, following expulsion from membership in incumbent unions, simply for exercising the right to organize an independent union.
• the presence on supposedly impartial labour tribunals in Mexico (conciliation and arbitration boards) of a representative from a central labour body, the CTM, which is closely linked with the government, whose interest is clearly to deny registration and recognition to independent unions.
• failure to ensure reinstatement of employees fired for union activity, in part through lengthy delays that force employees to accept severance pay.
• failure by labour tribunals to:
  1. register and recognize independent unions, on spurious grounds;
  2. arrange fair elections;
  3. protect against violence and intimidation during union organization campaigns;
  4. conduct secret ballot votes;
  5. convene public hearings with due notice and expedition;
  6. ensure an opportunity for victimized workers and unions to present evidence and make submissions;
  7. issue impartial decisions;
  8. correct the biased composition of tribunal panels.

8. In Canada, the exclusion of agricultural workers, domestic workers and many professional employees from the right to organize in some provinces has recently been roundly condemned by the ILO. In some jurisdictions inadequate protection exists to prevent plant closures for anti-union reasons. In other provinces, undue limitations have been imposed on the right to strike and on independent arbitration, and state intervention to end perfectly legal strikes has continued to occur on an ad hoc basis. The federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police force has been denied the same right to organize that is enjoyed by all other Canadian police forces. Across the country, previously high labour standards, in the areas of unemployment insurance, employment equity programs and workers' compensation benefits, have been weakened. In most provinces, migrant workers have little or no protection under labour legislation.

9. Overall, what has been demonstrated in the series of cases which have arisen under the NAALC during the past four years is a "persistent pattern of failure" by some governments to effectively enforce their labour laws as they relate to the cardinal principle of freedom of association. The importance of this principle cannot be overemphasized because it is a necessary condition for the realization of virtually all of the other labour principles: the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, prohibition of forced labour, labour protection for children, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment discrimination, equal pay for women and men, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, provision of workers' compensation, and protection of migrant workers.

10. Not enough has been achieved as a result of proceedings under the NAALC to correct either specific violations of labour laws or the process of enforcement (or non-enforcement) of labour laws generally. While in some cases NAO findings have led to ministerial consultations, these have resulted, for the most part, only in informational seminars on an international plane. The problem is not that the authorities are not informed of the requirements of their own laws, but that they have been unable or unwilling to enforce them. Ultimately, it is the workers who suffer, through sub-standard wages, job insecurity, and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions. This was not the promise of NAFTA or of the NAALC, and purportedly not the intention of those who negotiated the NAALC.

Flaws in the NAALC

11. What has gone wrong? The main problem is that, while noble in its aspirations, the NAALC is flawed in its construction. Listed below are a number of the deficiencies apparent in the NAALC.

1. While a major objective of the NAALC is to promote the Eleven Labour Principles set out in Annex 1 - the first of which is freedom of association - this objective is not reflected in an obligation to implement these Principles. Indeed, Annex 1 emphasizes that the Eleven Principles are guiding only, are subject to each state's domestic law, and do not establish common standards, but rather broad areas of concern. The central ILO Conventions pertinent to these Eleven Labour Principles should, at the very least, be fully implemented.

2. Article 2 recognizes the right of each state to establish its own domestic labour standards, but requires that each government ensure that its labour laws provide for high labour standards. It could be said that Article 2 establishes a positive obligation to take the "high road" to economic development, but at this point in time the language of Article 2 has not been given any real effect.

3. Articles 3 to 5 of the NAALC require that each government effectively enforce its labour laws, provide for access to tribunals and procedures for enforcement, and ensure through due process and other procedural guarantees that enforcement proceedings are "fair, equitable and transparent". These Articles do not oblige a government to enact or even maintain labour laws of a high standard, but require only that a government enforce the labour laws it does enact.

4. Moreover, and most significantly, the response to non-compliance with the NAALC is, as experience confirms, very weak. Three tiers of scrutiny are established, for no defensible reason, and the lowest level of scrutiny is reserved for the right of workers to take collective action - arguably the primary condition for the achievement of all of the other Labour Principles. Thus, for example, a submission regarding denial of the right to organize can be processed only so far as ministerial consultations. This process has proved ineffectual, either in redressing the specific violation complained of or in achieving enforcement of the law in subsequent cases.
   NAALC - THREE TIERS OF ENFORCEMENT

   TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3
   NAO Ministerial Consultations	Evaluation Committee of Experts	Arbitration before Arbitral Panels
   All eleven Labour Principles including the right to organize, bargain and strike	Eight of the eleven Labour Principles, including prohibitions of forced labour, child labour, and employment discrimination; minimum labour standards (e.g. minimum wages and overtime); equal pay for men and women; health and safety; workers' compensation and protection of migrant workers	Three of the Labour Principles, i.e. health and safety, child labour and minimum wages

   
   
   

   The NAALC specifically provides that violations of collective rights - the rights to organize, bargain and strike - cannot be examined by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (Article 23) or processed to arbitration before an Arbitral Panel (Article 29). Indeed, only three matters - health and safety, child labour and minimum wages - can be pursued to the arbitration stage. This is unacceptable since it is only at arbitration that a binding decision can be made that carries with it an actual sanction or remedy, i.e. an action plan and a monetary enforcement assessment. Moreover, the entire process - from submission to arbitration - is so protracted that it would take years to complete.

5. A series of further restrictions narrow access to the NAALC. Matters complained of must be trade-related, and covered by mutually recognized labour laws before they can be referred to the ECE or an Arbitral Panel (Articles 23, 29). Only persistent patterns of failure to enforce labour laws can be pursued to these levels, so that single instances of violation, no matter how egregious, cannot be corrected (Articles 27, 29 and 49). A government is permitted to raise as a defense that it has decided to allocate its resources to the enforcement of other labour matters (Article 49); this is simply unacceptable. There is also no sanction available directly against trans-national corporations that are recidivist offenders.

6. Proceedings before the ECE or an Arbitral Panel cannot be initiated by workers or trade unions whose rights are violated. Only a signatory government can request the establishment of an ECE (Article 23). Referral to arbitration requires approval of two-thirds of the signatory governments (Article 29). In short, the process is essentially political.

7. There is no provision for a remedy that would require the government violating the NAALC to redress the violation giving rise to the complaint. Indeed, the NAALC specifies that proceedings and decisions of a state's tribunals are not subject to revision or reopening (Article 5, 8). If a matter proceeds to the ECE or to an Arbitral Panel, as indicated above, only persistent patterns of practice will be examined, and not single cases, no matter how flagrant they may be (Article 49). Surely, effective recourse should be available when governments and governmental bodies fail to comply with the basic Principles set out in the NAALC.

Recommendations 13. In light of the experience under the NAALC, CALL makes the following recommendations:

1. The eleven Labour Principles set out in Annex 1 of the NAALC should become minimum obligations rather than merely unenforceable objectives, and should be part of the NAFTA itself.

2. The division of the Labour Principles into three tiers, with the lowest and least effective sanction reserved for freedom of association, should be abandoned. Access to the ECE should be extended to the rights to organize, bargain and strike and access to arbitration should no longer be limited to matters involving health and safety, child labour and minimum wages; arbitration should be available to resolve matters involving all eleven Labour Principles. The entire process - from submission to arbitration - should be shortened and simplified.

3. Article 2 should be given effect so as to require signatory governments to ensure that their labour laws do in fact provide for high labour standards, e.g. secret ballot votes, fair elections, protection against discharge for organizing trade unions, unbiased and expeditious hearings before independent labour tribunals, etc.

4. Restrictions limiting access to NAALC procedures should be removed, and inappropriate defenses repealed. Specific reference is made to the exclusion of single cases from resolution by the ECE or an Arbitral Panel, even though such cases may involve flagrant breaches of the NAALC by the government involved.

5. If domestic procedures prove to be non-existent or ineffectual, provision should be made for proceedings to be initiated before the ECE and Arbitral Panels by workers and trade unions who suffer violations of the NAALC. Access to an effective remedy should not be capable of being barred by the very government or by the trans-national corporation which offends the NAALC.

6. The NAALC should be amended to require appropriate action in cases giving rise to complaints, as well as corrective action to prevent future violations.

7. The thresholds for initiation of procedures by Canada under Annex 46 (Article 4(c)) should be repealed.

8. Funding for the work of NAALC agencies - and in particular the Canadian NAO - should be increased. In this regard, it should be noted that, in CALL's view, the Canadian NAO has been well served by capable administrators, including notably its Secretary, Ms. May Morpaw.

9. Funding should be provided for workers and independent unions to initiate and participate in proceedings and to engage in co-operative activities under the NAALC. Adequate funding in these areas is essential to an effective co-operative program.

10. Remedies for non-compliance with the NAALC should be expanded, and sanctions should attach both to offending governments and to those corporate entities who have benefited from their failure to enforce domestic labour legislation in violation of NAALC commitments. Remedies/sanctions should be applied without penalizing the workers who are victims of NAALC violations.

11. In order to further genuine co-operative activities under the NAALC, efforts should be made to enhance the participation of workers and independent trade unions, and steps should be taken, including funding, to ensure the participation of independent workers' organizations, in seminars, sessions and other co-operative initiatives, such as the development of corporate codes of conduct and fair trade labelling of products, should be explored and developed. The amelioration of the plight of migrant workers should be a priority.

12. A fund should be established in every jurisdiction covered by the NAALC to compensate workers disadvantaged by NAFTA, and a regional development fund should be established to facilitate achievement of high labour standards in those jurisdictions where resources are needed.

Canadian Labour Congress
Robert White, President

As you may remember, the Canadian Labour Congress did considerable work and analysis of the economic model of integration exemplified in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and we have made these views known to the Canadian government through a number of briefs, submissions to parliamentary committees and published studies and reports. I don't intend to repeat all of the arguments presented in these fora, but I do think it is important to review some of what we call NAFTA's "unfulfilled promises" in the context of the NAALC review.

The Canadian Labour Congress opposed the FTA with the US and the NAFTA because, in our view, these so-called "free trade" agreements in effect "constitutionalize" a radical "free market" economic agenda by very closely limiting and confining the role of democratic government vis à vis the market economy. At the same time corporations are free to shift production, investment, profits and jobs largely as they see fit, subject only to the logic of business profitability. This increases the business sector's bargaining power over both labour and governments. Although it is not the only factor, such mobility enhances the power of corporations to "harmonize" wages, working conditions, taxes and regulations across jurisdictions. In the context of the US labour movement's weaker collective bargaining coverage, this was of major concern for Canadian workers. In the 1980s, US real wages had tended to fall and collective bargaining coverage declined even as productivity rose, while real wages and benefits in Canada had remained more or less constant, in part because of the greater leverage of unions. In the context of NAFTA, Mexico, as a low wage developing country, magnified the issues of potential job loss and "downward harmonization" particularly for US workers.

It should also be mentioned that the feared "downward harmonization" pressures of international competition has, as predicted, undermined Canada's stronger set of social programs, particularly Unemployment Insurance and Medicare.

There were a whole range of problems with regards to Mexico that should have been foreseen, such as its hidden unemployment, its huge foreign debt requiring continual refinancing and an overvalued currency. Perhaps most important from the CLC's point of view, was the reality of Mexico's corporatist system of control over the labour movement which has played a major role in holding back wages to achieve economic goals set by the government rather than acting as an independent voice for workers. As I am sure you are aware, political changes in the Mexican Congress and the very recent formation of a new labour federation may have an important impact on the ability of Mexican workers to respond to the challenges of economic integration in NAFTA.

The CLC and other progressive critics of NAFTA predicted that "free-trade" would exacerbate the significant shift of manufacturing production and jobs to Mexico in response to low wages and low labour, social and environmental standards depressing employment, wages, living standards and worker bargaining power in the US and Canada. A key concern in the NAFTA debate was weak (to say the least) respect for democratic, human and labour rights in Mexico, and low levels of labour standards and environmental regulation. Critics drew attention to the fact that NAFTA lacked a "social dimension" and created significant new rights for capital without putting in place any corresponding set of minimum obligations to respect basic labour rights and standards, or minimum environmental and health and safety regulations. In this respect, NAFTA differed greatly from the European Community process of economic integration, which has seen some explicit attempts to establish minimum standards, as in the area of health and safety, the creation of Euro-Works councils, as well as a regional parliament and a redistributive fund to reduce the economic disparities between richer and poorer countries.

It was in response to such criticisms that NAFTA was implemented along with labour and environment "side deals" which established what purports to be a minimum - or minimal - social framework. The labour side deal or NAALC, as you know, requires each country only to respect and enforce its own labour laws, and does not require a country to respect a common set of basic labour rights as defined in conventions of the International Labour Organization. It thus falls far short of the idea of "binding social clauses" inserting recognized core labour rights and enforceable standards in trade agreements as called for by the international labour movement. While the labour side-deal did establish procedures for governments to examine complaints on labour rights and standards and thus to publicize abuses, it falls far short of the mechanisms necessary to truly remedy market failures and halt the downward pressures on wages and standards. In our view, the NAALC has had little relevance for Canadian workers. This view is based on conclusions from a recently-completed study for the ILO, "Impacts of the CUSFTA and the NAFTA on Canadian Labour Markets and Labour and Social Standards". I am attaching a copy of this study in the event that you or your staff may wish to pursue the details of our research.

As you also know, the CLC and affiliates have participated in a number of events which are part of the Cooperative Workplan co-managed by the three labour ministries. The Workplan consists of tri-national conferences, workshops and seminars on such topics as industrial relations, occupational health, women, etc. We note the great care taken by the three National Administrative Offices (NAOs) to select a wide variety of participants, drawn from lists of government officials, academics, lawyers, business representatives and unions and, that the major goal of these events is to share information on the laws, regulations and practice concerning specific issues in the three countries. Given the current changes in the Mexican labour movement as described above, the NAALC Cooperative Workplan could contribute to the raising of labour standards in Mexico (as per the obligations of the NAALC) if efforts could be made to ensure that all sectors of the Mexican labour movement could participate in the cooperative agenda. As currently implemented, I thing there is a de facto exclusion of any labour representation that is not part of the corporatist mechanism.

With regard to the complaint process, as you know, seven of the eight cases pertain to the violation of the right to freedom of association, the most fundamental workers' right recognized by the international community and advocated by the International Labour Organization. Six of these violations were documented in Mexico, one in the United States. All of the Mexican violations vividly illustrate the inability of the independent union movement in Mexico to break through the party/slate/CTM corporatist alliance in order to allow Mexican workers to actually enjoy their right to freedom of association. After four years of NAALC implementation, there is still not one independent union in the entire maquiladora region. The case of the workers of a Sony subsidiary, Magnéticos de Mexico, who were violently beaten, denied their union, and ultimately their jobs, raises serious doubts about the potential value and positive outcomes of the NAALC. For these Mexican workers, the NAALC has been at best negligent, at worst a fraud, for it led them to believe that the side-deal would offer them some protection of their rights.

Notwithstanding the NAALC Cooperative Workplan and complaints process, the evidence remains that Mexican workers do not enjoy their rights and the Mexican state does not have the capacity nor the will to remedy this situation. According to a recent publication by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Internationally-Recognized Core Labour Standards in Mexico, Report for the WTO General Council Review of The Trade Policies of Mexico (Oct. 7, 1997), the fact that the right to organize and the right to strike are not always respected in Mexico are serious limitations which "weaken trade union bargaining potential and, particularly in the maquiladora sector, deprive many workers of the benefits of union membership".

These conclusions would suggest that the NAALC could be improved if it were to develop and effective mechanism to help groups of workers achieve their rights. One idea might be the creation of a special fund to help with legal costs or to provide financial remedies for workers and unions with no resources who are confronting the inadequacy of labour law enforcement and disregard for the labour principles of the NAALC.

The experience and results of the so-called "Sprint case" also point to the inadequate nature of the existing dispute resolution and individual remedies provided by the NAALC. The particular case of the Spring workers is still before the courts in the US, however, a related study done by the Labour Secretariat documents the anti-union culture of many corporations who use plant closures and threats of plants closing to avoid union drives in North America thereby violating the right to freedom of association. The NAALC as currently constructed has not and cannot remedy this problem. This points, again, to the need for strengthening or adding such measures as minimum enforceable standards that can be monitored, assessed and remedied more effectively.

Almost all of the complaints taken to the NAALC to date relate to the NAALC's first labour principle, the right to freedom of association. This points to one of the many procedural flaws in the agreement. The separation of workers' rights and technical labour standards is an artificial one and should be eliminated. There is no justification in my mind as to why the violation of fundamental workers' rights, grouped as "industrial relations standards" should have the lowest treatment in a list of "eleven labour principles".

In addition, the process for a NAALC labour dispute to eventually get to the final steps of monetary assessment could take as many as 1,320 days-nearly four years. This is in sharp contrast to mechanisms of the NAFTA itself in which investors and defenders of intellectual property rights are granted access, both civil and criminal, to a process to defend their rights. Surely, labour negotiators could find a mechanism to streamline the unreasonably arduous NAALC process.

We would like to encourage the continuation and broadening of the independent reviews and studies carried out by the Labour Secretariat. Future themes to be undertaken might include investment flows in North America and the relationship between labour standards and foreign investment. The Secretariat might also review efforts to extend the obligations for labour rights enforcement to employers through such mechanisms as codes of conduct including compliance and independent monitoring.

The final issue I would like to bring to your attention in the context of the NAALC review is the role played by U.S. labour and environmental side agreements have proven ineffective. Under the terms of the labor side agreement, even when the workers have proven their case satisfactorily, the remedies have been inconsequential and the abuses have continued....thus, a minimum condition for any expansion of NAFTA must be that it include enforceable labor and environmental standards in the agreement itself. The side-agreement approach has not worked."

We reiterate that the Canadian Labour Congress shares the views of the international labour and human rights movements regarding the inextricable linkage between social issues and trade in all contexts including NAFTA. We must find the appropriate mechanism to ensure that the integration of our countries' economies and markets takes place through a "high road" of development which raises standards in all jurisdictions rather than "a race to the bottom" as workers compete for investment through lower wages, standards and social programs.

To apply the "social clause" proposal of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); NAFTA should incorporate the eleven labour principles currently contained in the NAALC into the core text of the trade agreement itself and, the contracting parties should agree to take steps to ensure the observance of these labour standards. NAFTA should establish and advisory committee to work with the ILO to provide remedies for workers whose rights are repeatedly violated.

Children's Rights Center
Katherine Covell

My experience with the office of the NAALC has been restricted to participation in the two meetings to discuss the issue of child labor. From my perspective, these meetings have been very worthwhile, and their continuation is necessary. The increase in dialogue and psychological comfort level from the first in San Diego to the second in Ottawa was quite remarkable, and attests to both the level of organization and the degree of commitment of those involved.

The issue of child labor is of extreme importance, and not separate from related issues of labor and labor unions. Continued joint efforts to resolve the problems of child labor among the three countries should have as a by-product an orientation to harmonizing, within reason, related labor issues.

The discussions on child labour have been very useful also in highlighting the nature of the problems in each of the various countries. Identification of problem issues is, of course, the preliminary step to effective interventions. The improving of children's lives through continued discussion and consequent implementation of suggestions further can serve as a model to the rest of the world.

Confédération des syndicats nationaux
Pierre Paquette, Secrétaire général

1. Approche de la CSN sur l'ANACT

La Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) a suivi avec beaucoup d'intérêt la mise en la mise en place et l'application de l'Accord nord-américain de coopération dans le domaine du travail (ANACT) dés la période de gestation de l'Accord. En 1993, la CSN a accepté l'invitation que lui a faite le gouvernement canadien à participer à un comité ad hoc créé pour informer et consulter les organisations patronales et syndicales du Canada sur le déroulement des négociations de ce qui est devenu l'ANACT. Le représentant de la CSN à ce comité a exprimé les recommandations de notre organisation à l'effet de négocier un accord qui s'appuierait sur des conventions internationales en matière du travail et qui contiendrait des dispositions contraignantes pour assurer la mise en application de l'accord.

L'accord qui est issu des négociations trinationales en 1993, l'ANACT, n'allait pas permettre, à notre avis, de corriger les impacts négatifs sur les conditions de travail qui découleraient inévitablement de l'ALÉNA, dont la conclusion était arrivée en 1992. C'est ainsi que la CSN recommandait au Gouvernement du Canada de ne pas ratifier l'ALÉNA et les deux accords parallèles, sur le travail et sur l'environnement, qui l'accompagnaient.

La CSN considérait, cependant, que l'ANACT, tout en n'étant pas suffisant, pouvait fournir des instruments permettant de constater et de faire connaître des lacunes dans l'application des lois du travail des trois pays, ce qui pourrait éventuellement contribuer à corriger certaines de ces lacunes. Après l'entrée en vigueur de l'ALÉNA en janvier 1994, la CSN s'est donc impliquée pour participer à bon nombre d'activités organisées dans le cadre de l'application de l'ANACT. Étant donné que l'Accord prévoit la ratification par les provinces canadiennes, la CSN a également réalisé des représentations auprès du Gouvernement du Québec (la grande majorité des membres de la CSN sont résidants de cette province) pour que celui-ci ratifie l'ANACT à son tour.

2. Activités de dialogue et de coopération

Le fait que sept provinces canadiennes n'aient toujours pas ratifié l'ANACT et que certaines ne l'ont ratifié que tardivement, (le Québec ne l'a fait qu'en avril 1997), signifie que l'expérience canadienne en matière de l'application de l'Accord demuere limitée. En effet, l'ANACT prévoit que toutes les dispositions de l'Accord ne s'appliqueront au Canada avant que certains seuils ne soient atteints quant à la proportion de travailleurs canadiens représentée par des juridictions ayant ratifié l'accord. Cependant, le Canada a été un participant à part entière au volet dialogue et coopération entre les trois pays en matière des lois du travail. Nous émettrons donc quelques opinions sur le fonctionnement de l'ANACT pour ce qui est de ce volet. De plus, nous avons observé le fonctionnement de l'ANACT pour ce qui est du volet plaintes et enquêtes et proposons d'émettre quelques opinions sur ce sujet également.

Depuis la ratification de l'ANACT et la mise en place des différentes structures de coopération internationale, le Secrétariat de l'ANACT à Dallas a organisé plusieurs activités trinationales d'information, d'analyse et d'échange sur la législation du travail dans le trois pays et sur les problèmes qui surviennent dans le respect des onze principes fondamentaux auxquels les trois pays ont souscrit dans l'Accord.

La CSN désire exprimer sa satisfaction quant à la grande variété de sujets abordés lors de ces activités et sur la manière dont elles ont été organisées. Le Secrétariat a bien su identifier plusieurs sujets de préoccupation majeure concernant le respect des normes minimales du travail et sur les conséquences, au niveau des conditions de travail, de l'intégration économique en Amérique du Nord. Des sujets comme le lien entre la productivité et la rémunération, le travail des enfants, les problèmes spécifiques rencontrés par les femmes travailleuses, les probèmes quant au respect du droit d'association, sont tous de sujets de première importance méritant d'être examinés dans le cadre de l'application de l'ANACT. Nous avons également apprécié l'approche du Secrétariat à l'effet d'organiser des colloques thématiques en fonction de certains problèmes particulièrement criants qui se sont manifestés lors du dépôt de plaintes en vertu de l'ANACT, notamment sur des problèmes de reconnaissance syndicale qui ont été signalés au Mexique et aux États-Unis.

En assurant une présence tripartite (gouvernementale-patronale-syndicale) ainsi que d'experts exprimant des points de vue différents sur les sujets discutés en colloques, le Secrétariat a réussi à faire en sorte que les discussions sur les sujets choisis soient à la fois riches et variées. Nous devons, cependant, déplorer certaines absences lors de ces consultations. En particulier, nous ne pouvons qu'exprimer notre déception que les syndicats non officiels du Mexique, pourtant ceux qui rencontrent de fréquents problèms de reconnaissance syndicale, n'ont généralment pas été invités aux activités organisées par le Secrétariat.

La CSN a déjà eu l'occasion de communiquer au ministre du Travail du Canada sa grande satisfaction quant à la transparence, l'ouverture et la volonté de collaboration manifestées tant par le personnel du Secrétariat trinational de l'ANACT dirigé par M. John McKennirey, que par celui du Bureau administratif canadien dirigé par Mme May Morpaw. Les critiques que nous exprimons plus loin quant à l'efficacité de l'ANACT ne portent aucunement sur le personnel responsable de son application avec qui nous avons eu le plaisir de travailler. Ces personnes réalisent un travail formidable en dépit des limitations de l'Accord, du peu de ressources qui est accordé au Secrétariat et aux Bureaux administratifs nationaux (BAN) et de l'importance des défis auxquels elles doivent faire face.

3. Mécanisme de plaintes

Lors de son analyse de l'ANACT réalisée après la publication de celui-ci en 1993, la CSN a critiqué plusieurs aspects du mécanisme de plaintes prévu par l'Accord. Les critiques les plus fortes concernaient trois aspects: les très long délais prévus par l'Accord pour ce qui est du traitement des plaintes; la portée très limitée des mesures contraignantes prévues par l'Accord; le fait que l'Accord n'exige que le respect des lois nationales plutôt que de s'appuyer sur des normes convenues au niveau international.

Jusqu'en novembre 1997 moins de dix plaintes ont été déposées à des BAN en vertu de l'ANACT, ce que d'aucuns pourraient être tentés d'interpréter comme une démonstration que le respect des droits et normes du travail dans les trois pays ne soulève que peu de problèmes. Nous croyons que le nombre très faible de plaintes s'explique plutôt par les problèmes que nous avons signalés au moment de la conclusion de l'Accord:

1. Les délais - L'Accord prévoit plusieurs étapes pour traiter les plaintes avant que celles-ci n'arrivent aux étapes ultimes. Les délais prévus pour chaque étape peuvent représenter plusieurs mois, voire des années. Devant la perspective de rencontrer des très longs délais, il est évident que des groupes de travailleurs faisant face à des problèmes néssitant des solutions rapides ne verront pas l'intérêt de recourir à l'ANACT, d'autant plus que l'Accord ne prévoit aucun soutien financier pour préparer et mener à bien des plaintes.

2. Absence de mesures contraignantes - Malgré que les trois pays signataires s'engagent à respecter onze principes de base en matire des droits et normes du travail, ils ont jugé bon de ne soumettre que trois de ces principes à la pleine application de l'ensemble des dispositions de l'ANACT. Ainsi, le recours aux sanctions ne peut s'appliquer que dans des cas touchant la non application des lois en matière du salaire minimum, du travail des enfants et de la santé et la sécurité au travail. Faut-il donc se surprendre qu'il n'y ait pas eu plus de plaintes dans un domaine comme la discrimination contre les femmes travailleuses, lorsqu'on sait que le meilleur résultat du recours sera une recommandation au gouvernement fautif pour qu'il applique ses lois?

3. Absence de normes internationales - Les trois pays signataires se sont engagés à appliquer des lois nationales dans les domaines touchés par les onze principes de base. Rien ne les oblige á souscrire à des normes défines en commun. Or, le problème qui se pose dans certains des domaines indiqués, ce n'est pas la non-application des normes nationales mais bien la faiblesse de ces normes. C'est le cas, par exemple, au chapitre de la loi du salaire minimum au Mexique. En novembre 1997, le salaire minimum qui s'appliquait dans ce pays variait, selon la région géographique, de 22,50 à 26,50 pesos, l'équivalent de 2,73 à 3,21 $US, par journée de huit heures. De plus, la valeur en termes de pouvoir d'achat du salaire minimum a même diminué de quelque 30% depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord.

Peu importe les facteurs qui expliquent que les deux autres pays n'aient pas été davantage touchés par des plaintes, les différentes plaintes, et les enquêtes et colloques qui les ont suivis, ont identifié des lacunes majeures dans l'application des lois mexicaines en matière de liberté d'organisation. On aurait pu espérer que les différentes démarches enterprises par le Secrétariat et le Counseil ministériel aient amené les autorités mexicaines à apporter des corrections. Force nous est de constater que les abus en matière de liberté d'association son encore monnaie courante au Mexique.

Cela a été démontré dans un cas très récent survenu à Tijuana (Baja California), lorsqu'un syndicat des travailleurs de la métallurgie affilié à une centrale non-officielle, le Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), a gagné un vote pour une accréditation syndicale contre une organisation rivale dans l'entreprise de propriété sud-coréene, Han Young. Le fait qu'un syndicat non-officiel ait pu gagné le vote dans la zone de la maquiladora, malgré les obstacles qui existent, dont notamment l'absence d'un vote secret (le vote, à voix haute, a lieu devant des représentants de l'enterprise et de l'employeur), etait reconnu comme une percée important pour la démocratie syndicale au Mexique. Mais l'acte d'accréditaiton du syndicat du FAT, qui devait n'être qu'une simple formalité, n'a pas eu lieu. Le président du conseil du travail gouvernemental à Tijuana qui a permis que le vote ait lieu a été congédié, et son successeur a statué le 11 novembre 1997 que l'accréditation serait accordée au syndicat affilié à une organisation officielle qui avait perdu le vote.

Conclusion et recommandations.

Comme nous l'avons mentionné, en dépit de ses critiques quant aux faiblesses de l'ANACT, la CSN s'est investie pour participer aux différents forums créés en fonction de l'Accord et pour convaincre le gouvernement québécois de le ratifier. Tout en soulignant l'excellent travail réalisé par le Secrétariat de l'ANACT et par le BAN canadien, nous devons malheureusement constater que l'approche de l'ANACT voulant favoriser une amélioration des conditions de travail et des droits des travailleurs, essentiellement par le dialogue et la coopération, a été un échec. Comme on vient de le faire remarquer, la liberté d'association n'existe pas encore au Mexique, presque quatre après l'entrée en vigueur de l'ANACT. Et malgré le fait que, comme l'a souligné le plus récent rapport annuel de la Commission de coopération, le premier objectif de l'ANACT soit celui? [d']améloirer las conditions de travail et le niveau de vie sur territoire de chacune des Parties?, on observe que les salaire moyen réel au Mexique, toute comme le salaire minimum réel, a connu une réduction de quelque 30% entre 1994 et 1997.

Nous avons formulé certaines critiques quant au fonctionnement de l'ANACT dans les pages qui précèdent, dont les plus fondamentales portent sur l'absence de normes internationales et la portée limitée des mesures contraignantes. Nous croyons que si des corrections étaient apportées, l'efficacité de l'Accord serait de beaucoup améliorée. De plus, nous croyons que le respect des lois du travail dans les trois pays serait favorisé si l'ANACT contenait des obligations plus concrètes quant à la consultation de la societé civile, et notamment les organisations syndicales, dans chaque pays. À ce titre, nous avons appris que les organisations syndicales non-officielles du Mexique n'ont pas été consultées par le BAN mexicain dans le cadre du processus d'évaluation de l'Accord qui est en cours. De plus, nous croyons que l'efficacité de l'Acccord serait améliorée si les instances administratives de l'ANACT étaient élargies pour y inclure des représentants des organisations syndicales et patronales, s'inspirant ainsi des mécanismes adminstratifs de l'accord nord-américain de coopération sur l'environnement.

Nous vous soumettons les cinq propositions qui suivent quant à l'ANACT et son fonctionnement:

1. Inclure dans les normes et droits du travail que les trois pays s'engagent à respecter l'obligation d'appliquer sept conventions fondamentales de l'OIT touchant les sujets suivants:
   • liberté d'association et droit à la négociation collective (conventions 87 et 98);
   • interdiction du travail forcé (conventions 29 et 105);
   • interdiction du travail des enfants (convention 138);
   • interdiction de la discrimination sur le marché du travail (conventions 100 et 111).

2. Amorcer des discussions au sein de la Commission de coopération en vue d'intégrer d'autres conventions de l'OIT dans les engagements nationaux pour l'ANACT. Une première discussion pourrait avoir lieu sur les conventions touchant l'établissement du salaire minimum.

3. Rendre l'ensemble des étapes, incluant l'application de sanctions, disponible pour tout type de plaintes déposés en cas de violation des principes de l'Accord, dont l'ultime étape prévoyant l'application de sanctions en case de non respect.

4. Prévoir des soutiens financiers pour aider des groupes en ayant besoin à préparer la déposition de plaintes devant les BAN.

5. Introduire dans l'ANACT des dispositions plus concrètes quant à l'obligation de consulter les organisations syndicales, patronales et non-gouvernementales dans chaque pays et inclure une représentation syndicale et patronale dans les instances administratives de l'ANACT.

Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec
Henri Massé, Secrétaire général

INTRODUCTION

Depuis les négociations du premier accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis, la Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) a toujours été préoccupée par les retombées de ces ententes. La centrale estimait - et estime toujours d'ailleurs - que les accords de libéralisation des échanges ont une portée qui dépasse nettement les seules considérations commerciales. En fait, ils transforment profondément les milieux de travail de même que la vie sociale et culturelle des pays concernés.

C'est pourquoi la FTQ s'est résolument engagée dans ce dosssier. Nous avons participé activement aux travaux de différentes coalitions québécoises dont les principales activités visaient à analyser les effets de l'intégration économique continentale et à mettre sur la place publique les enjeux relatifs au libre-échange afin de susciter un large débat démocratique sur cette question. Dans nos mémoires, nous avons critiqué l'approche strictement commerciale des négociations de l'ALÉNA et avons revendiqué des dispositions pour protéger les droits sociaux et du travail, des droits humains et culturels et des programmes d'ajustement.

Tout en poursuivant ses représentations à l'échelle provinciale et Fedérale, la TFQ a intensifié ses interventions à l'échelle transnationale. Nous avons organisé des missions au cours desquelles nos représentants et représentantes ont tissé des liens de solidarité avec des syndicalistes et des organisations pospulaires américaines et mexicaines. Dernièrement, la FTQ conjointement avec le Réseau québécois sur l'intégration continentale (RQIC), a organisé un colloque international sur l'intégration économique des Amériques. Dans le cadre de cet événement, la FTQ s'était spécifiquement penchée sur les forces et les faibleses de l'ANACT.

Bref retour sur les positions défendues par la FTQ

Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, permettez-nous de faire un bref retour sur les positions défendues par la FTQ dans ce dossier. Dès le début des négociations de l'accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA), la FTQ s'était prononcée en faveur d'un élargissement des échanges entre le Canada, les États-Unis et le Mexique à condition que celui-ci contribue à établir des rapports économiques plus justes et