Annex 5: Public Comments

Canada

Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers
Sheila Greckol, Jeffrey Sack, Claude Melançon

Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers (CALL)

1. The Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers is a national organization of 250 lawyers representing workers and trade unions across Canada. CALL has members and elected representatives from every region of the country and is active in education, legislative and administrative advocacy, and numerous other activities aimed at protecting and advancing the rights of workers and basic trade union freedoms. CALL was co-sponsor and co-chair of a Canada-Mexico Conference on the NAALC, held in Mexico in January 1996, and has co-sponsored and co-chaired a Canada-Chile Conference, held in Chile in April 1998, on the protection of workers' rights and co-operation under hemispheric trade treaties, with particular reference to promoting compliance and co-operative activities under the NAALC. Both of these conferences have involved support and participation from government, labour and business, as well from lawyers representing unions and employers.

The Promise of the NAALC

2. The promise of the NAALC is substantial. Its preamble calls, among other things, for protecting, enhancing and enforcing basic workers' rights; strengthening labour-management co-operation; promoting higher living standards; and encouraging compliance with labour laws and co-operation in maintaining a progressive, fair, safe and healthy working environment. The objectives of the NAALC include the improvement of working conditions and living standards; the promotion of basic labour principles (the first of eleven being freedom of association and the right to organize); and the promotion of compliance with, and effective enforcement of, labour laws. The obligations under the NAALC require that each government ensure that its labour laws provide for high labour standards (Article 2), promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labour laws (Article 3), and ensure access to tribunals through proceedings that are fair, equitable and transparent (Articles 4 and 5).

3. The essence of a trade agreement is to make it easier for companies to do business free of the constraints of national regulation. In order to ensure that this is not achieved at the expense of labour standards - through "social dumping", "downward harmonization of labour laws", and a "race to the bottom" - the goal must be "fair trade" - trade that is accompanied by high labour standards, enforcement of basic labour rights, and compliance with the rule of law. This is the promise of the NAALC, and the expectation of workers in the countries whose governments are parties to it. At the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Secretaries of Labour of the United States and Mexico and Canada's Labour Minister on September 18, 1997, U.S. Secretary of Labour, Alexis M. Herman, confirmed this intention. "President Clinton and I are committed to protecting worker rights in North America," Secretary Herman said.

The Experience under the NAALC

4. Regrettably, the promise of the NAALC has been belied by the experience under it. The events of the past four years demonstrate that the NAALC is seriously flawed, and has achieved little of its original promise.

5. What is the experience of the past four years? Again and again, in cases involving different companies - General Electric, Honeywell, Sony, Spring, Han, and Echlin - the basic rights of workers to organize unions of their choice have been frustrated by unfair labour practices on the part of trans-national corporations - such as plant closure, mass firings, rigged elections, violence and intimidation - and by the failure of some governments and governmental agencies to deal impartially and effectively with flagrant anti-union conduct.

6. Practices which stand out as particularly offensive are:

• the absence of secret ballots in union representation votes.
• the operation of "exclusion clauses" that allow workers to be fired, following expulsion from membership in incumbent unions, simply for exercising the right to organize an independent union.
• the presence on supposedly impartial labour tribunals in Mexico (conciliation and arbitration boards) of a representative from a central labour body, the CTM, which is closely linked with the government, whose interest is clearly to deny registration and recognition to independent unions.
• failure to ensure reinstatement of employees fired for union activity, in part through lengthy delays that force employees to accept severance pay.
• failure by labour tribunals to:
  1. register and recognize independent unions, on spurious grounds;
  2. arrange fair elections;
  3. protect against violence and intimidation during union organization campaigns;
  4. conduct secret ballot votes;
  5. convene public hearings with due notice and expedition;
  6. ensure an opportunity for victimized workers and unions to present evidence and make submissions;
  7. issue impartial decisions;
  8. correct the biased composition of tribunal panels.

8. In Canada, the exclusion of agricultural workers, domestic workers and many professional employees from the right to organize in some provinces has recently been roundly condemned by the ILO. In some jurisdictions inadequate protection exists to prevent plant closures for anti-union reasons. In other provinces, undue limitations have been imposed on the right to strike and on independent arbitration, and state intervention to end perfectly legal strikes has continued to occur on an ad hoc basis. The federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police force has been denied the same right to organize that is enjoyed by all other Canadian police forces. Across the country, previously high labour standards, in the areas of unemployment insurance, employment equity programs and workers' compensation benefits, have been weakened. In most provinces, migrant workers have little or no protection under labour legislation.

9. Overall, what has been demonstrated in the series of cases which have arisen under the NAALC during the past four years is a "persistent pattern of failure" by some governments to effectively enforce their labour laws as they relate to the cardinal principle of freedom of association. The importance of this principle cannot be overemphasized because it is a necessary condition for the realization of virtually all of the other labour principles: the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, prohibition of forced labour, labour protection for children, minimum employment standards, elimination of employment discrimination, equal pay for women and men, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, provision of workers' compensation, and protection of migrant workers.

10. Not enough has been achieved as a result of proceedings under the NAALC to correct either specific violations of labour laws or the process of enforcement (or non-enforcement) of labour laws generally. While in some cases NAO findings have led to ministerial consultations, these have resulted, for the most part, only in informational seminars on an international plane. The problem is not that the authorities are not informed of the requirements of their own laws, but that they have been unable or unwilling to enforce them. Ultimately, it is the workers who suffer, through sub-standard wages, job insecurity, and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions. This was not the promise of NAFTA or of the NAALC, and purportedly not the intention of those who negotiated the NAALC.

Flaws in the NAALC

11. What has gone wrong? The main problem is that, while noble in its aspirations, the NAALC is flawed in its construction. Listed below are a number of the deficiencies apparent in the NAALC.

1. While a major objective of the NAALC is to promote the Eleven Labour Principles set out in Annex 1 - the first of which is freedom of association - this objective is not reflected in an obligation to implement these Principles. Indeed, Annex 1 emphasizes that the Eleven Principles are guiding only, are subject to each state's domestic law, and do not establish common standards, but rather broad areas of concern. The central ILO Conventions pertinent to these Eleven Labour Principles should, at the very least, be fully implemented.

2. Article 2 recognizes the right of each state to establish its own domestic labour standards, but requires that each government ensure that its labour laws provide for high labour standards. It could be said that Article 2 establishes a positive obligation to take the "high road" to economic development, but at this point in time the language of Article 2 has not been given any real effect.

3. Articles 3 to 5 of the NAALC require that each government effectively enforce its labour laws, provide for access to tribunals and procedures for enforcement, and ensure through due process and other procedural guarantees that enforcement proceedings are "fair, equitable and transparent". These Articles do not oblige a government to enact or even maintain labour laws of a high standard, but require only that a government enforce the labour laws it does enact.

4. Moreover, and most significantly, the response to non-compliance with the NAALC is, as experience confirms, very weak. Three tiers of scrutiny are established, for no defensible reason, and the lowest level of scrutiny is reserved for the right of workers to take collective action - arguably the primary condition for the achievement of all of the other Labour Principles. Thus, for example, a submission regarding denial of the right to organize can be processed only so far as ministerial consultations. This process has proved ineffectual, either in redressing the specific violation complained of or in achieving enforcement of the law in subsequent cases.
   NAALC - THREE TIERS OF ENFORCEMENT

   TIER 1	TIER 2	TIER 3
   NAO Ministerial Consultations	Evaluation Committee of Experts	Arbitration before Arbitral Panels
   All eleven Labour Principles including the right to organize, bargain and strike	Eight of the eleven Labour Principles, including prohibitions of forced labour, child labour, and employment discrimination; minimum labour standards (e.g. minimum wages and overtime); equal pay for men and women; health and safety; workers' compensation and protection of migrant workers	Three of the Labour Principles, i.e. health and safety, child labour and minimum wages

   
   
   

   The NAALC specifically provides that violations of collective rights - the rights to organize, bargain and strike - cannot be examined by an Evaluation Committee of Experts (Article 23) or processed to arbitration before an Arbitral Panel (Article 29). Indeed, only three matters - health and safety, child labour and minimum wages - can be pursued to the arbitration stage. This is unacceptable since it is only at arbitration that a binding decision can be made that carries with it an actual sanction or remedy, i.e. an action plan and a monetary enforcement assessment. Moreover, the entire process - from submission to arbitration - is so protracted that it would take years to complete.

5. A series of further restrictions narrow access to the NAALC. Matters complained of must be trade-related, and covered by mutually recognized labour laws before they can be referred to the ECE or an Arbitral Panel (Articles 23, 29). Only persistent patterns of failure to enforce labour laws can be pursued to these levels, so that single instances of violation, no matter how egregious, cannot be corrected (Articles 27, 29 and 49). A government is permitted to raise as a defense that it has decided to allocate its resources to the enforcement of other labour matters (Article 49); this is simply unacceptable. There is also no sanction available directly against trans-national corporations that are recidivist offenders.

6. Proceedings before the ECE or an Arbitral Panel cannot be initiated by workers or trade unions whose rights are violated. Only a signatory government can request the establishment of an ECE (Article 23). Referral to arbitration requires approval of two-thirds of the signatory governments (Article 29). In short, the process is essentially political.

7. There is no provision for a remedy that would require the government violating the NAALC to redress the violation giving rise to the complaint. Indeed, the NAALC specifies that proceedings and decisions of a state's tribunals are not subject to revision or reopening (Article 5, 8). If a matter proceeds to the ECE or to an Arbitral Panel, as indicated above, only persistent patterns of practice will be examined, and not single cases, no matter how flagrant they may be (Article 49). Surely, effective recourse should be available when governments and governmental bodies fail to comply with the basic Principles set out in the NAALC.

Recommendations 13. In light of the experience under the NAALC, CALL makes the following recommendations:

1. The eleven Labour Principles set out in Annex 1 of the NAALC should become minimum obligations rather than merely unenforceable objectives, and should be part of the NAFTA itself.

2. The division of the Labour Principles into three tiers, with the lowest and least effective sanction reserved for freedom of association, should be abandoned. Access to the ECE should be extended to the rights to organize, bargain and strike and access to arbitration should no longer be limited to matters involving health and safety, child labour and minimum wages; arbitration should be available to resolve matters involving all eleven Labour Principles. The entire process - from submission to arbitration - should be shortened and simplified.

3. Article 2 should be given effect so as to require signatory governments to ensure that their labour laws do in fact provide for high labour standards, e.g. secret ballot votes, fair elections, protection against discharge for organizing trade unions, unbiased and expeditious hearings before independent labour tribunals, etc.

4. Restrictions limiting access to NAALC procedures should be removed, and inappropriate defenses repealed. Specific reference is made to the exclusion of single cases from resolution by the ECE or an Arbitral Panel, even though such cases may involve flagrant breaches of the NAALC by the government involved.

5. If domestic procedures prove to be non-existent or ineffectual, provision should be made for proceedings to be initiated before the ECE and Arbitral Panels by workers and trade unions who suffer violations of the NAALC. Access to an effective remedy should not be capable of being barred by the very government or by the trans-national corporation which offends the NAALC.

6. The NAALC should be amended to require appropriate action in cases giving rise to complaints, as well as corrective action to prevent future violations.

7. The thresholds for initiation of procedures by Canada under Annex 46 (Article 4(c)) should be repealed.

8. Funding for the work of NAALC agencies - and in particular the Canadian NAO - should be increased. In this regard, it should be noted that, in CALL's view, the Canadian NAO has been well served by capable administrators, including notably its Secretary, Ms. May Morpaw.

9. Funding should be provided for workers and independent unions to initiate and participate in proceedings and to engage in co-operative activities under the NAALC. Adequate funding in these areas is essential to an effective co-operative program.

10. Remedies for non-compliance with the NAALC should be expanded, and sanctions should attach both to offending governments and to those corporate entities who have benefited from their failure to enforce domestic labour legislation in violation of NAALC commitments. Remedies/sanctions should be applied without penalizing the workers who are victims of NAALC violations.

11. In order to further genuine co-operative activities under the NAALC, efforts should be made to enhance the participation of workers and independent trade unions, and steps should be taken, including funding, to ensure the participation of independent workers' organizations, in seminars, sessions and other co-operative initiatives, such as the development of corporate codes of conduct and fair trade labelling of products, should be explored and developed. The amelioration of the plight of migrant workers should be a priority.

12. A fund should be established in every jurisdiction covered by the NAALC to compensate workers disadvantaged by NAFTA, and a regional development fund should be established to facilitate achievement of high labour standards in those jurisdictions where resources are needed.

Canadian Labour Congress
Robert White, President

As you may remember, the Canadian Labour Congress did considerable work and analysis of the economic model of integration exemplified in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and we have made these views known to the Canadian government through a number of briefs, submissions to parliamentary committees and published studies and reports. I don't intend to repeat all of the arguments presented in these fora, but I do think it is important to review some of what we call NAFTA's "unfulfilled promises" in the context of the NAALC review.

The Canadian Labour Congress opposed the FTA with the US and the NAFTA because, in our view, these so-called "free trade" agreements in effect "constitutionalize" a radical "free market" economic agenda by very closely limiting and confining the role of democratic government vis à vis the market economy. At the same time corporations are free to shift production, investment, profits and jobs largely as they see fit, subject only to the logic of business profitability. This increases the business sector's bargaining power over both labour and governments. Although it is not the only factor, such mobility enhances the power of corporations to "harmonize" wages, working conditions, taxes and regulations across jurisdictions. In the context of the US labour movement's weaker collective bargaining coverage, this was of major concern for Canadian workers. In the 1980s, US real wages had tended to fall and collective bargaining coverage declined even as productivity rose, while real wages and benefits in Canada had remained more or less constant, in part because of the greater leverage of unions. In the context of NAFTA, Mexico, as a low wage developing country, magnified the issues of potential job loss and "downward harmonization" particularly for US workers.

It should also be mentioned that the feared "downward harmonization" pressures of international competition has, as predicted, undermined Canada's stronger set of social programs, particularly Unemployment Insurance and Medicare.

There were a whole range of problems with regards to Mexico that should have been foreseen, such as its hidden unemployment, its huge foreign debt requiring continual refinancing and an overvalued currency. Perhaps most important from the CLC's point of view, was the reality of Mexico's corporatist system of control over the labour movement which has played a major role in holding back wages to achieve economic goals set by the government rather than acting as an independent voice for workers. As I am sure you are aware, political changes in the Mexican Congress and the very recent formation of a new labour federation may have an important impact on the ability of Mexican workers to respond to the challenges of economic integration in NAFTA.

The CLC and other progressive critics of NAFTA predicted that "free-trade" would exacerbate the significant shift of manufacturing production and jobs to Mexico in response to low wages and low labour, social and environmental standards depressing employment, wages, living standards and worker bargaining power in the US and Canada. A key concern in the NAFTA debate was weak (to say the least) respect for democratic, human and labour rights in Mexico, and low levels of labour standards and environmental regulation. Critics drew attention to the fact that NAFTA lacked a "social dimension" and created significant new rights for capital without putting in place any corresponding set of minimum obligations to respect basic labour rights and standards, or minimum environmental and health and safety regulations. In this respect, NAFTA differed greatly from the European Community process of economic integration, which has seen some explicit attempts to establish minimum standards, as in the area of health and safety, the creation of Euro-Works councils, as well as a regional parliament and a redistributive fund to reduce the economic disparities between richer and poorer countries.

It was in response to such criticisms that NAFTA was implemented along with labour and environment "side deals" which established what purports to be a minimum - or minimal - social framework. The labour side deal or NAALC, as you know, requires each country only to respect and enforce its own labour laws, and does not require a country to respect a common set of basic labour rights as defined in conventions of the International Labour Organization. It thus falls far short of the idea of "binding social clauses" inserting recognized core labour rights and enforceable standards in trade agreements as called for by the international labour movement. While the labour side-deal did establish procedures for governments to examine complaints on labour rights and standards and thus to publicize abuses, it falls far short of the mechanisms necessary to truly remedy market failures and halt the downward pressures on wages and standards. In our view, the NAALC has had little relevance for Canadian workers. This view is based on conclusions from a recently-completed study for the ILO, "Impacts of the CUSFTA and the NAFTA on Canadian Labour Markets and Labour and Social Standards". I am attaching a copy of this study in the event that you or your staff may wish to pursue the details of our research.

As you also know, the CLC and affiliates have participated in a number of events which are part of the Cooperative Workplan co-managed by the three labour ministries. The Workplan consists of tri-national conferences, workshops and seminars on such topics as industrial relations, occupational health, women, etc. We note the great care taken by the three National Administrative Offices (NAOs) to select a wide variety of participants, drawn from lists of government officials, academics, lawyers, business representatives and unions and, that the major goal of these events is to share information on the laws, regulations and practice concerning specific issues in the three countries. Given the current changes in the Mexican labour movement as described above, the NAALC Cooperative Workplan could contribute to the raising of labour standards in Mexico (as per the obligations of the NAALC) if efforts could be made to ensure that all sectors of the Mexican labour movement could participate in the cooperative agenda. As currently implemented, I thing there is a de facto exclusion of any labour representation that is not part of the corporatist mechanism.

With regard to the complaint process, as you know, seven of the eight cases pertain to the violation of the right to freedom of association, the most fundamental workers' right recognized by the international community and advocated by the International Labour Organization. Six of these violations were documented in Mexico, one in the United States. All of the Mexican violations vividly illustrate the inability of the independent union movement in Mexico to break through the party/slate/CTM corporatist alliance in order to allow Mexican workers to actually enjoy their right to freedom of association. After four years of NAALC implementation, there is still not one independent union in the entire maquiladora region. The case of the workers of a Sony subsidiary, Magnéticos de Mexico, who were violently beaten, denied their union, and ultimately their jobs, raises serious doubts about the potential value and positive outcomes of the NAALC. For these Mexican workers, the NAALC has been at best negligent, at worst a fraud, for it led them to believe that the side-deal would offer them some protection of their rights.

Notwithstanding the NAALC Cooperative Workplan and complaints process, the evidence remains that Mexican workers do not enjoy their rights and the Mexican state does not have the capacity nor the will to remedy this situation. According to a recent publication by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Internationally-Recognized Core Labour Standards in Mexico, Report for the WTO General Council Review of The Trade Policies of Mexico (Oct. 7, 1997), the fact that the right to organize and the right to strike are not always respected in Mexico are serious limitations which "weaken trade union bargaining potential and, particularly in the maquiladora sector, deprive many workers of the benefits of union membership".

These conclusions would suggest that the NAALC could be improved if it were to develop and effective mechanism to help groups of workers achieve their rights. One idea might be the creation of a special fund to help with legal costs or to provide financial remedies for workers and unions with no resources who are confronting the inadequacy of labour law enforcement and disregard for the labour principles of the NAALC.

The experience and results of the so-called "Sprint case" also point to the inadequate nature of the existing dispute resolution and individual remedies provided by the NAALC. The particular case of the Spring workers is still before the courts in the US, however, a related study done by the Labour Secretariat documents the anti-union culture of many corporations who use plant closures and threats of plants closing to avoid union drives in North America thereby violating the right to freedom of association. The NAALC as currently constructed has not and cannot remedy this problem. This points, again, to the need for strengthening or adding such measures as minimum enforceable standards that can be monitored, assessed and remedied more effectively.

Almost all of the complaints taken to the NAALC to date relate to the NAALC's first labour principle, the right to freedom of association. This points to one of the many procedural flaws in the agreement. The separation of workers' rights and technical labour standards is an artificial one and should be eliminated. There is no justification in my mind as to why the violation of fundamental workers' rights, grouped as "industrial relations standards" should have the lowest treatment in a list of "eleven labour principles".

In addition, the process for a NAALC labour dispute to eventually get to the final steps of monetary assessment could take as many as 1,320 days-nearly four years. This is in sharp contrast to mechanisms of the NAFTA itself in which investors and defenders of intellectual property rights are granted access, both civil and criminal, to a process to defend their rights. Surely, labour negotiators could find a mechanism to streamline the unreasonably arduous NAALC process.

We would like to encourage the continuation and broadening of the independent reviews and studies carried out by the Labour Secretariat. Future themes to be undertaken might include investment flows in North America and the relationship between labour standards and foreign investment. The Secretariat might also review efforts to extend the obligations for labour rights enforcement to employers through such mechanisms as codes of conduct including compliance and independent monitoring.

The final issue I would like to bring to your attention in the context of the NAALC review is the role played by U.S. labour and environmental side agreements have proven ineffective. Under the terms of the labor side agreement, even when the workers have proven their case satisfactorily, the remedies have been inconsequential and the abuses have continued....thus, a minimum condition for any expansion of NAFTA must be that it include enforceable labor and environmental standards in the agreement itself. The side-agreement approach has not worked."

We reiterate that the Canadian Labour Congress shares the views of the international labour and human rights movements regarding the inextricable linkage between social issues and trade in all contexts including NAFTA. We must find the appropriate mechanism to ensure that the integration of our countries' economies and markets takes place through a "high road" of development which raises standards in all jurisdictions rather than "a race to the bottom" as workers compete for investment through lower wages, standards and social programs.

To apply the "social clause" proposal of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU); NAFTA should incorporate the eleven labour principles currently contained in the NAALC into the core text of the trade agreement itself and, the contracting parties should agree to take steps to ensure the observance of these labour standards. NAFTA should establish and advisory committee to work with the ILO to provide remedies for workers whose rights are repeatedly violated.

Children's Rights Center
Katherine Covell

My experience with the office of the NAALC has been restricted to participation in the two meetings to discuss the issue of child labor. From my perspective, these meetings have been very worthwhile, and their continuation is necessary. The increase in dialogue and psychological comfort level from the first in San Diego to the second in Ottawa was quite remarkable, and attests to both the level of organization and the degree of commitment of those involved.

The issue of child labor is of extreme importance, and not separate from related issues of labor and labor unions. Continued joint efforts to resolve the problems of child labor among the three countries should have as a by-product an orientation to harmonizing, within reason, related labor issues.

The discussions on child labour have been very useful also in highlighting the nature of the problems in each of the various countries. Identification of problem issues is, of course, the preliminary step to effective interventions. The improving of children's lives through continued discussion and consequent implementation of suggestions further can serve as a model to the rest of the world.

Confédération des syndicats nationaux
Pierre Paquette, Secrétaire général

1. Approche de la CSN sur l'ANACT

La Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) a suivi avec beaucoup d'intérêt la mise en la mise en place et l'application de l'Accord nord-américain de coopération dans le domaine du travail (ANACT) dés la période de gestation de l'Accord. En 1993, la CSN a accepté l'invitation que lui a faite le gouvernement canadien à participer à un comité ad hoc créé pour informer et consulter les organisations patronales et syndicales du Canada sur le déroulement des négociations de ce qui est devenu l'ANACT. Le représentant de la CSN à ce comité a exprimé les recommandations de notre organisation à l'effet de négocier un accord qui s'appuierait sur des conventions internationales en matière du travail et qui contiendrait des dispositions contraignantes pour assurer la mise en application de l'accord.

L'accord qui est issu des négociations trinationales en 1993, l'ANACT, n'allait pas permettre, à notre avis, de corriger les impacts négatifs sur les conditions de travail qui découleraient inévitablement de l'ALÉNA, dont la conclusion était arrivée en 1992. C'est ainsi que la CSN recommandait au Gouvernement du Canada de ne pas ratifier l'ALÉNA et les deux accords parallèles, sur le travail et sur l'environnement, qui l'accompagnaient.

La CSN considérait, cependant, que l'ANACT, tout en n'étant pas suffisant, pouvait fournir des instruments permettant de constater et de faire connaître des lacunes dans l'application des lois du travail des trois pays, ce qui pourrait éventuellement contribuer à corriger certaines de ces lacunes. Après l'entrée en vigueur de l'ALÉNA en janvier 1994, la CSN s'est donc impliquée pour participer à bon nombre d'activités organisées dans le cadre de l'application de l'ANACT. Étant donné que l'Accord prévoit la ratification par les provinces canadiennes, la CSN a également réalisé des représentations auprès du Gouvernement du Québec (la grande majorité des membres de la CSN sont résidants de cette province) pour que celui-ci ratifie l'ANACT à son tour.

2. Activités de dialogue et de coopération

Le fait que sept provinces canadiennes n'aient toujours pas ratifié l'ANACT et que certaines ne l'ont ratifié que tardivement, (le Québec ne l'a fait qu'en avril 1997), signifie que l'expérience canadienne en matière de l'application de l'Accord demuere limitée. En effet, l'ANACT prévoit que toutes les dispositions de l'Accord ne s'appliqueront au Canada avant que certains seuils ne soient atteints quant à la proportion de travailleurs canadiens représentée par des juridictions ayant ratifié l'accord. Cependant, le Canada a été un participant à part entière au volet dialogue et coopération entre les trois pays en matière des lois du travail. Nous émettrons donc quelques opinions sur le fonctionnement de l'ANACT pour ce qui est de ce volet. De plus, nous avons observé le fonctionnement de l'ANACT pour ce qui est du volet plaintes et enquêtes et proposons d'émettre quelques opinions sur ce sujet également.

Depuis la ratification de l'ANACT et la mise en place des différentes structures de coopération internationale, le Secrétariat de l'ANACT à Dallas a organisé plusieurs activités trinationales d'information, d'analyse et d'échange sur la législation du travail dans le trois pays et sur les problèmes qui surviennent dans le respect des onze principes fondamentaux auxquels les trois pays ont souscrit dans l'Accord.

La CSN désire exprimer sa satisfaction quant à la grande variété de sujets abordés lors de ces activités et sur la manière dont elles ont été organisées. Le Secrétariat a bien su identifier plusieurs sujets de préoccupation majeure concernant le respect des normes minimales du travail et sur les conséquences, au niveau des conditions de travail, de l'intégration économique en Amérique du Nord. Des sujets comme le lien entre la productivité et la rémunération, le travail des enfants, les problèmes spécifiques rencontrés par les femmes travailleuses, les probèmes quant au respect du droit d'association, sont tous de sujets de première importance méritant d'être examinés dans le cadre de l'application de l'ANACT. Nous avons également apprécié l'approche du Secrétariat à l'effet d'organiser des colloques thématiques en fonction de certains problèmes particulièrement criants qui se sont manifestés lors du dépôt de plaintes en vertu de l'ANACT, notamment sur des problèmes de reconnaissance syndicale qui ont été signalés au Mexique et aux États-Unis.

En assurant une présence tripartite (gouvernementale-patronale-syndicale) ainsi que d'experts exprimant des points de vue différents sur les sujets discutés en colloques, le Secrétariat a réussi à faire en sorte que les discussions sur les sujets choisis soient à la fois riches et variées. Nous devons, cependant, déplorer certaines absences lors de ces consultations. En particulier, nous ne pouvons qu'exprimer notre déception que les syndicats non officiels du Mexique, pourtant ceux qui rencontrent de fréquents problèms de reconnaissance syndicale, n'ont généralment pas été invités aux activités organisées par le Secrétariat.

La CSN a déjà eu l'occasion de communiquer au ministre du Travail du Canada sa grande satisfaction quant à la transparence, l'ouverture et la volonté de collaboration manifestées tant par le personnel du Secrétariat trinational de l'ANACT dirigé par M. John McKennirey, que par celui du Bureau administratif canadien dirigé par Mme May Morpaw. Les critiques que nous exprimons plus loin quant à l'efficacité de l'ANACT ne portent aucunement sur le personnel responsable de son application avec qui nous avons eu le plaisir de travailler. Ces personnes réalisent un travail formidable en dépit des limitations de l'Accord, du peu de ressources qui est accordé au Secrétariat et aux Bureaux administratifs nationaux (BAN) et de l'importance des défis auxquels elles doivent faire face.

3. Mécanisme de plaintes

Lors de son analyse de l'ANACT réalisée après la publication de celui-ci en 1993, la CSN a critiqué plusieurs aspects du mécanisme de plaintes prévu par l'Accord. Les critiques les plus fortes concernaient trois aspects: les très long délais prévus par l'Accord pour ce qui est du traitement des plaintes; la portée très limitée des mesures contraignantes prévues par l'Accord; le fait que l'Accord n'exige que le respect des lois nationales plutôt que de s'appuyer sur des normes convenues au niveau international.

Jusqu'en novembre 1997 moins de dix plaintes ont été déposées à des BAN en vertu de l'ANACT, ce que d'aucuns pourraient être tentés d'interpréter comme une démonstration que le respect des droits et normes du travail dans les trois pays ne soulève que peu de problèmes. Nous croyons que le nombre très faible de plaintes s'explique plutôt par les problèmes que nous avons signalés au moment de la conclusion de l'Accord:

1. Les délais - L'Accord prévoit plusieurs étapes pour traiter les plaintes avant que celles-ci n'arrivent aux étapes ultimes. Les délais prévus pour chaque étape peuvent représenter plusieurs mois, voire des années. Devant la perspective de rencontrer des très longs délais, il est évident que des groupes de travailleurs faisant face à des problèmes néssitant des solutions rapides ne verront pas l'intérêt de recourir à l'ANACT, d'autant plus que l'Accord ne prévoit aucun soutien financier pour préparer et mener à bien des plaintes.

2. Absence de mesures contraignantes - Malgré que les trois pays signataires s'engagent à respecter onze principes de base en matire des droits et normes du travail, ils ont jugé bon de ne soumettre que trois de ces principes à la pleine application de l'ensemble des dispositions de l'ANACT. Ainsi, le recours aux sanctions ne peut s'appliquer que dans des cas touchant la non application des lois en matière du salaire minimum, du travail des enfants et de la santé et la sécurité au travail. Faut-il donc se surprendre qu'il n'y ait pas eu plus de plaintes dans un domaine comme la discrimination contre les femmes travailleuses, lorsqu'on sait que le meilleur résultat du recours sera une recommandation au gouvernement fautif pour qu'il applique ses lois?

3. Absence de normes internationales - Les trois pays signataires se sont engagés à appliquer des lois nationales dans les domaines touchés par les onze principes de base. Rien ne les oblige á souscrire à des normes défines en commun. Or, le problème qui se pose dans certains des domaines indiqués, ce n'est pas la non-application des normes nationales mais bien la faiblesse de ces normes. C'est le cas, par exemple, au chapitre de la loi du salaire minimum au Mexique. En novembre 1997, le salaire minimum qui s'appliquait dans ce pays variait, selon la région géographique, de 22,50 à 26,50 pesos, l'équivalent de 2,73 à 3,21 $US, par journée de huit heures. De plus, la valeur en termes de pouvoir d'achat du salaire minimum a même diminué de quelque 30% depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord.

Peu importe les facteurs qui expliquent que les deux autres pays n'aient pas été davantage touchés par des plaintes, les différentes plaintes, et les enquêtes et colloques qui les ont suivis, ont identifié des lacunes majeures dans l'application des lois mexicaines en matière de liberté d'organisation. On aurait pu espérer que les différentes démarches enterprises par le Secrétariat et le Counseil ministériel aient amené les autorités mexicaines à apporter des corrections. Force nous est de constater que les abus en matière de liberté d'association son encore monnaie courante au Mexique.

Cela a été démontré dans un cas très récent survenu à Tijuana (Baja California), lorsqu'un syndicat des travailleurs de la métallurgie affilié à une centrale non-officielle, le Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (FAT), a gagné un vote pour une accréditation syndicale contre une organisation rivale dans l'entreprise de propriété sud-coréene, Han Young. Le fait qu'un syndicat non-officiel ait pu gagné le vote dans la zone de la maquiladora, malgré les obstacles qui existent, dont notamment l'absence d'un vote secret (le vote, à voix haute, a lieu devant des représentants de l'enterprise et de l'employeur), etait reconnu comme une percée important pour la démocratie syndicale au Mexique. Mais l'acte d'accréditaiton du syndicat du FAT, qui devait n'être qu'une simple formalité, n'a pas eu lieu. Le président du conseil du travail gouvernemental à Tijuana qui a permis que le vote ait lieu a été congédié, et son successeur a statué le 11 novembre 1997 que l'accréditation serait accordée au syndicat affilié à une organisation officielle qui avait perdu le vote.

Conclusion et recommandations.

Comme nous l'avons mentionné, en dépit de ses critiques quant aux faiblesses de l'ANACT, la CSN s'est investie pour participer aux différents forums créés en fonction de l'Accord et pour convaincre le gouvernement québécois de le ratifier. Tout en soulignant l'excellent travail réalisé par le Secrétariat de l'ANACT et par le BAN canadien, nous devons malheureusement constater que l'approche de l'ANACT voulant favoriser une amélioration des conditions de travail et des droits des travailleurs, essentiellement par le dialogue et la coopération, a été un échec. Comme on vient de le faire remarquer, la liberté d'association n'existe pas encore au Mexique, presque quatre après l'entrée en vigueur de l'ANACT. Et malgré le fait que, comme l'a souligné le plus récent rapport annuel de la Commission de coopération, le premier objectif de l'ANACT soit celui? [d']améloirer las conditions de travail et le niveau de vie sur territoire de chacune des Parties?, on observe que les salaire moyen réel au Mexique, toute comme le salaire minimum réel, a connu une réduction de quelque 30% entre 1994 et 1997.

Nous avons formulé certaines critiques quant au fonctionnement de l'ANACT dans les pages qui précèdent, dont les plus fondamentales portent sur l'absence de normes internationales et la portée limitée des mesures contraignantes. Nous croyons que si des corrections étaient apportées, l'efficacité de l'Accord serait de beaucoup améliorée. De plus, nous croyons que le respect des lois du travail dans les trois pays serait favorisé si l'ANACT contenait des obligations plus concrètes quant à la consultation de la societé civile, et notamment les organisations syndicales, dans chaque pays. À ce titre, nous avons appris que les organisations syndicales non-officielles du Mexique n'ont pas été consultées par le BAN mexicain dans le cadre du processus d'évaluation de l'Accord qui est en cours. De plus, nous croyons que l'efficacité de l'Acccord serait améliorée si les instances administratives de l'ANACT étaient élargies pour y inclure des représentants des organisations syndicales et patronales, s'inspirant ainsi des mécanismes adminstratifs de l'accord nord-américain de coopération sur l'environnement.

Nous vous soumettons les cinq propositions qui suivent quant à l'ANACT et son fonctionnement:

1. Inclure dans les normes et droits du travail que les trois pays s'engagent à respecter l'obligation d'appliquer sept conventions fondamentales de l'OIT touchant les sujets suivants:
   • liberté d'association et droit à la négociation collective (conventions 87 et 98);
   • interdiction du travail forcé (conventions 29 et 105);
   • interdiction du travail des enfants (convention 138);
   • interdiction de la discrimination sur le marché du travail (conventions 100 et 111).

2. Amorcer des discussions au sein de la Commission de coopération en vue d'intégrer d'autres conventions de l'OIT dans les engagements nationaux pour l'ANACT. Une première discussion pourrait avoir lieu sur les conventions touchant l'établissement du salaire minimum.

3. Rendre l'ensemble des étapes, incluant l'application de sanctions, disponible pour tout type de plaintes déposés en cas de violation des principes de l'Accord, dont l'ultime étape prévoyant l'application de sanctions en case de non respect.

4. Prévoir des soutiens financiers pour aider des groupes en ayant besoin à préparer la déposition de plaintes devant les BAN.

5. Introduire dans l'ANACT des dispositions plus concrètes quant à l'obligation de consulter les organisations syndicales, patronales et non-gouvernementales dans chaque pays et inclure une représentation syndicale et patronale dans les instances administratives de l'ANACT.

Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec
Henri Massé, Secrétaire général

INTRODUCTION

Depuis les négociations du premier accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis, la Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec (FTQ) a toujours été préoccupée par les retombées de ces ententes. La centrale estimait - et estime toujours d'ailleurs - que les accords de libéralisation des échanges ont une portée qui dépasse nettement les seules considérations commerciales. En fait, ils transforment profondément les milieux de travail de même que la vie sociale et culturelle des pays concernés.

C'est pourquoi la FTQ s'est résolument engagée dans ce dosssier. Nous avons participé activement aux travaux de différentes coalitions québécoises dont les principales activités visaient à analyser les effets de l'intégration économique continentale et à mettre sur la place publique les enjeux relatifs au libre-échange afin de susciter un large débat démocratique sur cette question. Dans nos mémoires, nous avons critiqué l'approche strictement commerciale des négociations de l'ALÉNA et avons revendiqué des dispositions pour protéger les droits sociaux et du travail, des droits humains et culturels et des programmes d'ajustement.

Tout en poursuivant ses représentations à l'échelle provinciale et Fedérale, la TFQ a intensifié ses interventions à l'échelle transnationale. Nous avons organisé des missions au cours desquelles nos représentants et représentantes ont tissé des liens de solidarité avec des syndicalistes et des organisations pospulaires américaines et mexicaines. Dernièrement, la FTQ conjointement avec le Réseau québécois sur l'intégration continentale (RQIC), a organisé un colloque international sur l'intégration économique des Amériques. Dans le cadre de cet événement, la FTQ s'était spécifiquement penchée sur les forces et les faibleses de l'ANACT.

Bref retour sur les positions défendues par la FTQ

Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, permettez-nous de faire un bref retour sur les positions défendues par la FTQ dans ce dossier. Dès le début des négociations de l'accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALÉNA), la FTQ s'était prononcée en faveur d'un élargissement des échanges entre le Canada, les États-Unis et le Mexique à condition que celui-ci contribue à établir des rapports économiques plus justes et favorise un développement économique et social démocratique. Bref, nous croyons que les accords de libre-échange peuvent être un outil permettant de combattre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale. Toutefois, pour atteindre ces objectifs, la FTQ estimait que les négociations devaient notamment inclure des dispositions particulières relatives aux droits du travail:

• les droits à la syndicalisation, à la négociation collective et à la grève;
• la fin immédiate du travail des enfants;
• des mesures visant à relever les niveaux des salaires au Mexique pour réduire les écarts salariaux entre les trois pays;
• l'égalisation des salaires pour un travail à valeur egale sans egard au sexe;
• l'égalité des droits des immigrants;
• des politiques visant à maximiser la création d'emplois. ¹

Suite à la ratification de l'ALÉNA, la FTQ a poursuivi sa réflexion et a proposé, conjointement avec le Réseau québécois sur l'intégration continentale (RQIC), que toute entente d'intégration économique devrait comporter les dix point suivants:

• une aide pour les travailleurs oeuvrant dans les secteurs et les régions affectés négativement par l'intégration économique;
• des provisions pour les droits individuels et collectifs et des mécanismes pour les mettre en oeuvre;
• une charte sociale pour les droits des travailleurs et les normes du travail basée sur les conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT) et des mécanismes pour les mettre en oeuvre;
• une charte environmentale;
• une charte assurant l'accès à des services sociaux de base (comme la gratuité de l'éducation primaire et secondaire, des soins de santé, une assistance sociale pur les pauvres) et des mesures compensatoires visant à fournir aux pays n'ayant pas des ressources suffisantes, les fonds nécessaires pour financer ces programmes;
• des provisions permettant la mise en oeuvre de mesures pour protéger les cultures nationales et les populations plus vulnérables;
• des provisions pour protéger les droits et les conditions de travail des travailleurs migrants;
• des provisions pour aider le Mexique et les autres pays adhérents à réduire le fardeau de la dette externe;
• les droits définis ci-desus doivent être « universels », tandis que les normes minimales du travail doivent tenir compte des spécificités des pays ou régions respectives;
• enfin, les fonds nécessaires pour rencontrer ces obligations doivent jouir d'un financement assuré. Par exemple, les gouvernements pourraient instaurer une taxe sur les transactions financières spéculatives.

C'est donc à l'aune de ces éléments précités que nous évaluerons le foncionnement et l'application de l'Accord nord-américain de coopération sur le travail (ANACT).

NOS PRINCIPALES CRITIQUES À L'ÉGARD DE L'ANACT

Nous avons regroupé nos principaux commentaires selon quatre grandes catégories:

1. Des considérations générales
2. Les objectifs visés par l'ANACT
3. Les activités de coopération
4. Le processus de règlement des différends

En deuxième lieu, une attention particulière sera accordée au préambule qui énonce les grands objectifs visés par l'ANACT. La FTQ considère qu'il est particulièrement important car il sert d'instrument d'interprétation et de fondement pour lancer des études et des plaintes.

Ensuite, nous commenterons les activités de coopération auxquelles la FTQ a participé. Ces activités se cristallisent principalement dans la tenue de séminaires et de colloques, dans l'organisation de stages de formation et la réalisation de projets de recherche sur l'un ou plusieurs des onze principes² liés au domaine du travail énoncés dans l'ANACT.

En dernier lieu, nous examinerons le mécanisme de règlement des différends en cas de plainte. Ce dernier volet constitue en quelque sorte l'aspect « réparation » des effets de l'ALÉNA lorsque les droits fondamentaux des travailleurs et travailleuses son bafoués.

1. CONSIDÉRATIONS GÉNÉRALES

1.1 Une première entente liant commerce international et travail

La mondialisation est caractérisée notamment par une forte progression des échanges de biens et services. Cet accroissement exacerbe la concurrence internationale. Au nom de la compétitivité, les enterprises tentent de réduire leurs coûts de production, incluant les coûts de la main-d'oeuvre, et développent des organisations du travail qui se rapprochent de l'esclavage de la fin du siècle dernier. L'intégration économique qui se réalise actuellement exerce de fortes pressions pour une harmonisation à la baisse des salaires, des conditions de travail et des programmes sociaux. La situation commande donc un meilleur contrôle du capitalisme.

Nous concevons, à la FTQ, que les enterprises souhaitent un développement rentable de leurs activités; c'est leur objectif économique. Mais elles doivent le faire dans le respect des valeurs sociales et du travail. Afin d'alléger la pression sur le niveau de vie des travailleurs et travailleuses, il apparaît tout à fait justifié et essentiel d'encadrer les ententes commerciales par des normes internationales du travail.

Soulignons que la Confédération internationale des syndicats libres (CISL) a d'ailleurs mené une campagne pour l'inclusion d'une clause sociale dans tous les accords commerciaux. Dans le cadre de cette campagne, la CISL réitérait son engagement à faire respecter les normes du travail fondamentales reconnues mondialement.

Toutefois, les principales organisations internationles, telles l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) et l'Organisation de coopération et de développment économique (OCDE), se sont inscrites en faux à l'idée d'introduire une clause sociale dans les accords commerciaux. Ces organisations proposent plutôt que la prise en compte de cette problématique soit confiée à l'Organisation internationale du travail. Malheureusement, comme l'OIT ne possède aucun pouvoir ou mécanisme contraignant lui permettant de forcer le respect des normes minimales par les pays, cette proposition sème le doute quant à l'efficacité de cette approche.

Ces éléments amènent la FTQ à conclure qu'il faut associer la régulation des normes du travail avec celles du commerce. Or, nous sommes d'avis que la présence même de deux accords parallèles (travail et environnement) à l'ALÉNA constitue la reconnaissance du fait que les accords commerciaux ont véritablement des incidences majeures sur le travail et l'environnement. L'ÁNACT es la première entente que lie - meme si ce n'est que de façon indirecte - commerce international et droit du travail. Á ce titre, la FTQ estime qu'elle constitue en acquis qu'il ne faut pas abroger mais qu'il faut plutôt chercher à améliorer.

Par conséquent, la FTQ considère que tous futurs accords commerciaux doivent comporter des dispositions touchant les questions du travail et de l'environnement. Cependant, ces dispositions devraient être intégrées dans le corps même des textes des ententes de libre-échange de façon à lier directement commerce international et travail.

1.2 Pour un forum syndical officiel

Quel est alors le mécanisme approprié pour éviter le « dumping social » que constitue la recherche de la compétitivité par le biais de bas salaires, de faibles avantages sociaux, de la déréglementation ? L'examen de projets d'intégration économique comme l'Union européene (UE) et le MERCOSUR³ , qui cherchent à harmoniser les normes sociales et du travail tout en étant respectueux des économies nationales, s'avère particulièrement instructif. Inspiré davantage de l'expérience européenne, le modèle d'intégration du MERCOSUR a prévu une participation étroite des grands mouvements sociaux et de la population civile aux négociations. Douze groupes de travail ont été mis sur pied - dont un sur les législations sociales et du travail - pour harmoniser les législations et réglementations nationales. Et c'est au sein du Forum consultatif économique et social que les organisations populaires et syndicales ont véhiculé leurs principales préoccupations. Par ailleurs, les discussions actuelles pour l'établissement d'une zone de libre-échange des Amériques (ZLÉA) ont reconnu comme partenaire officiel un Forum des milieux d'affaires.

À l'example de ce qui se fait au MERCOSUR et dans certaines instances internationales comme la Commission syndicale consultative (TUAC) de l'OCDE, tous des forum syndicaux reconnus par les instances politiques, la FTQ propose que soit formé un forum syndical officiel qui fasse partie prenante des discussions de l'ALÉNA et l'ANACT. Ce forum nous permettrait d'intervenir activement dans le dossier du libre-échange et du travail à l'échelle continentale.

2. DES OBJECTIFS LOUABLES MAIS...

Il est énoncé, dans le préambule, que l'ANACT vise l'amélioration des conditions de travail et du niveau de vie des populations des trois pays. Pourtant, le portrait que nous traçons aujourd'hui de la situation économique ne reflète pas les retombées positives qui devaient découler de l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord de libre-échange nord-américain.

Malgré le fait que les exportations sont allées croissantes et que les investissements ont augmenté, force est de constater que la restructuration économique suscitée par la ratification de l'Accord de libre-échange nord-américain a eu des indicences plutôt mitigées sur le marché du travail. Malgré la reprise économique, le marché du travail du Québec est caractérisé par une stagnation des salaires réels, des coupures dans les avantages sociaux, un taux de chômage toujours au-delà de 11%, une progression lente de l'emploi, un affaiblissement du filet de sécurité sociale, etc. De plus, les fusions d'entreprises, les restructurations, les rationalisations et la sous-traitance qui résultent d'une concurrence plus vive ajoutent à la précarité du marché du travail. Cette course à la productivité « à moindre coût » fait en sorte que les droits des travailleurs et des travailleuses, acquis de hautes luttes, sont menacés de toutes partes.

Bien qu'à moyen et à long terme, l'intégration économique puisse engendrer des bénéfices intéressants pour l'ensemble d'une société, il demeure que des mécanismes d'ajustement et de compensation doivent être prévus pour se prémunir des retombées négatives, tant économiques que sociales, qui ne tardent pas à se manifester à court terme sur les travailleurs et les travailleuses déplacés et sur les régions affectées par un accroissement des échanges commerciaux.

2.1 Pour une harmonisation à la hausse des normes du travail

Bien que les gouvernements déclarent faire prévaloir les onze principes relatifs au travail, dans les faits, ceux-ci ne sont liés que par l'obligation générale, soit « promouvoir l'observation de sa législation du travail et en assurer l'application efficace »⁴ . Ainsi, dans sa forme actuelle, l'ANACT ne permet que de garantir l'application des droits du travail existants et ne prévient aucunement la décision d'un gouvernement de modifier, même à la baisse, ses lois et ses réglementations en matière du travail. En ce sens, il n'est pas un outil de lutte contre le « dumping social ».

Par exemple, aucune disposition de l'ANACT incite le Mexique à hausser ses normes de salaire minimum de façon à réduire l'écart entre le salaire minimum des deux autres pays. De plus, les gouvernements sont entrés dans la course à la déréglementation (incluant celle du marché du travail) de façon à éliminer les irritants qui nuisent au libre fonctionnement des marchés. À titre d'exemple, soulignons les multiples réformes du programme de l'assurance-emploi dont l'esprit est désormais plus conforme à celui du programme américain. Pourtant, malgré les modifications apportées aux lois du travail et autres, les taux de chômage se maintiennent à des niveau trop élevés, la main-d'oeuvre active diminue, les salaires réels stagnent, les ménages s'appauvrissent, alors que le travail à temps partiel augmente et le travail autonome est en croissance vertigineuse. Bref, la libéralisation accrue des échanges exerce une réelle pression à la baisse sur les salaries, les avantages sociaux et les programmes sociaux.

À la FTQ, nous croyons que l'enjeu au coeur de l'intégration économique réside dans le respect des droits fondamentaux des travailleurs et travailleuses. À ce titre, nous devons tout mettre en oeuvre pour assurer ces droits. Pour éviter que la concurrence internationale ne prenne appui que sur l'exploitation de la main-d'oeuvre, une piste d'action consisterait à ce que les pays concernés harmonisent à la hausse les normes du travail. Cette harmonisation ferait en sorte que les relations commerciales reposeraient sur des règles de jeu semblables et équitables. Il importe aussi de reconnaître les inégalités et les asymétries existantes, et prévoir l'éstablissement de mécanismes économiques compensatoires pour les pays moins développés. De plus, pour éviter que le processus d'intégration n'accroisse les inégalités, une charte des normes et droits du travail nous apparaît incontournable. Cette charte devrait prévoir des mécanismes de surveillance et porter sur les droits collectifs (droits d'association, de négociation, de grève) que sur les droits individuels (salaire minimum, absence de discrimination, etc.).

Il peut être parfois difficile, dans la pratique, de concrétiser ces éléments. Nous pouvons, à cet égard, nous inspirer du modèle de l'Union européenne. En outre, il nous apparaît pertinent de souligner que les pays composant le MERCOSUR - où les politiques néolibérales sont appliqués avec plus de rigueur qu'ici - sont quand même parvenus à une entente de principe prévoyant qu'ils se dotent de normes communes en matière du travail dans un avenir rapproché.

Afin de promouvoir un modèle de relations industrielles respectueux de la main-d'oeuvre des trois pays et s'assurer que le processus d'intégration soit bénéfique à une majorité, la FTQ estime néssaire l'harmonisation à la hausse des normes du travail et l'adoption d'une charte de normes minimales de travail qui reposerait sur les normes établies dans les différentes conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT).

3. LE VOLET « COOPÉRATION » : DES AMÉLIORATIONS À APPORTER

Les activités de coopération prévues par l'ANACT visent à favoriser la compréhension par les parties des législations respectives dans le domaine du travail et, supposément, le renforcement de l'application des lois et de la réglementation du travail par les gouvernements en place.

3.1 Les conférences, colloques et Semaine nord-américaine de la sécurité et de la santé du travail

Les conférences auxquelles nous avons participé⁵, bien que fort intéressantes, possèdent soit un caractère très général ou, à l'opposé, très technique (avalance de statistiques, opacité des termes juridiques). Nous constatons qu'en général, il y a peu d'espace pour les discussions et les débats. Cela dit, nous estimons que les activités entreprises sous le volet « coopération » de l'ANACT offrent tout de même une variété d'actions et de forums de discussion fort intéressants et pertinents. Par exemple, la Conférence sur le travail des jeunes nous a permis de réaliser qu'il n'y avait pas d'encadrement législatif au Québec sur cette problématique. Donc, l'une des retombées de cette conférence a été justement l'adoption par le Québec du projet de loi 172 sur le travail de nuit des enfants. Bien que se projet de loi soit incomplet et commande qu'il soit bonifié, il s'agit d'un pas dans la bonne direction.

Enfin, le Secrétariat à la Commission de coopération sur le travail a aussi initié la tenue de la première Semaine nord-américaine de la sécurité et de la santé du travail à laquelle la FTQ a participé. Malheureusement, là encore, on n'a pas tenu compte de la place du mouvement syndical dans la promotion de ces activités ni du rôle essentiel et incontournable que nous jouons en matière de formation et d'information dans ce domaine.

La FTQ propose de revoir le mode de fonctionnement des ces activités de façon à assurer un espace suffisant pour favoriser les échanges et ainsi faire progresser le débat. En outre, afin de favoriser la participation syndicale à ces événements, nous proposons la mise en place d'une structure permanente réunissant les partenaires sociaux afin qu'ils puissent partager leurs compétences et coopèrent activement à l'organisation de ces activités.

3.2 Des études aux timides recommandations

La FTQ constate que la réduction des barrières tarifaires, les nouvelles technologies de l'information et les nouveaux modes d'organisation du travail, font en sorte qu'il est désormais beaucoup plus facile aujourd'hui de transférer des activités de production ou de service que cela ne l'était au cours des précédentes décennies. En effet, les employeurs brandissent de plus en plus la menace d'une délocalisation totale ou partielle vers le sud pour contrer des tentatives de syndicalisation.

C'est pour notamment évaluer l'ampleur de ce phénomène que le Secrétariat de la Commission de coopération dans le domaine du travail a entrepris, en 1995, la réalisation d'une étude intitulée Fermeture d'usines et droits des travailleurs en matière du travail. Cette étude composait, en fait, un des éléments du plan d'action établi suit à des consultations ministérielles tenues à la demande du Mexique relativement à la fermeture soudaine d'une entreprise de télémarketing située à San Francisco, juste avant un vote de représentation syndicale.

Vous connaissez bien, san aucun doute, les principales recommandations émises par les auteurs de cette étude. La FTQ évalue que cette étude est fort pertinente, d'autant plus qu'elle présente un grand nombre de données intéressantes sur les impacts des menaces de fermetures dans les campagnes de syndicalisation aux États-Unis, au Canada et au Mexique. Bien que nous appuyions les principales recommandations énoncées dans ledit rapport, nous déplorons, par ailleurs, le fait qu'il ne fasse pas état de la nécessité et de l'intérêt pour les gouvernements des trois pays de se doter de mesures concrètes (législation ou réglementation) sur les fermetures d'usines et les licenciements collectifs.

De telles mesures permettraient d'éviter que les entreprises multinationales menacent de déplacer la production vers le sud sous prétexte d'une syndicalisation potentielle ou effective.

La FTQ souhaite que les gouvernements mettent en oeuvre les principales recommandations contenues dans le rapport du Secrétariat, notamment celles relatives aux codes de conduite des entreprises. De plus, la FTQ demande la mise en place d'une législation efficace en matière de licenciements collectifs et de fermetures d'usines afin d'assurer une protection adéquate aux travailleurs et aux travailleuses touchés.

4. LE MÉCANISME DE RÈGLEMENT DES DIFFÉRENDS (PLAINTES)
4.1 La portée restreinte du mécanisme

Le large éventail des droits du travail inscrits dans l'ANACT nous appraît comme un élément positif de l'accord parallèle surtout si l'on considère la définition beaucoup plus étroite des droits retenus dans les débats entourant la « clause sociale »⁶ au sein des organisations internationales telles l'Union eùropéene et l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC).

Comme vous le savez, les plaintes déposées en fonction de l'ANACT peuvent recevoir sept niveaux de recours allant de la simple consultation entre bureaux administratifs nationaux (BAN) à l'application de sanctions éconimiques. Or, le fait de catégoriser les onze principes en trois groups chacun donnant accès à un niveau de « recours » différent, nous apparaît totalement injustifié et devrait faire l'objet d'une révision importante.

La première catégorie qui regroupe les principes de la liberté d'association et la protection du droit d'organisation, le droit de négocier collectivement et le droit à la grève, obtient le premier niveau de recours soit uniquement un processus de consultation « locale » ou de révision entre BAN. La mise en oeuvre des recommandations contenues dans le rapport du BAN se concrétise par le biais de consultations ministérielles uniquement. Le deuxième niveau, qui consiste à procécer à une évaluation (d'abord par un comité d'évaluation d'experts et ensuite par un Conseil ministériel) à la suite de la révision n'est possible que pour les sujets concernant le travail forcé, la non-discrimination en matière d'emploi, l'égalité de rémunération entre les hommes et les femmes. Enfin, seules les infractions aux lois interdisant le travail des enfants et régissant le salaire minimum et la santé et la sécurité du travail peuvent donner lieu à un processus complet pouvant mener à des sanctions économiques.

Or, au Mexique, c'est justement le premier groupe de principes qui fait l'objet d'une violation persistante. De fait, une majorité des plaintes déposées auprès des BAN⁷ américain et mexicain concernait la violation de la liberté d'association. Comme la compétitivité du Mexique est fondée sur l'existence de coûts salariaux très bas et d'une législation sociale peu contraignante, le gouvernement mexicain n'a pas intérêt à hausser les salaires. Seule une forte action syndicale permettrait aux travailleuses et aux travailleurs mexicains d'améliorer leurs conditions de travail et de hausser leurs niveaux de salaires.

La promotion d'une plus grande démocratie au sein du mouvement syndical, ici et dans les autres pays, sous-tend que l'on respecte le droit d'association. Un mouvement syndical fort est un gage pour un meilleur partage des gains de productivité.

À la FTQ bien que nous considérons que le respect des lois relatives à la santé et à la sécurité du travail, au travail des enfants et au salaire minimum soit essentiel, nous estimons que les droits syndicaux des travailleurs sont fondamentaux.

C'est la raison pour laquelle nous proposons que l'ensemble des onze principes puisse donner lieu à un processus de révision complet pouvant aller jusqu'à des sanctions économiques.

4.2 Des résultats mitigés

Le bilan que la FTQ tire actuellement des résultats du processus du règlement des différends de l'ANACT est plutôt sombre. Aujourd'hui, aucune plainte n'a mené à l'imposition de sanction ni même franchi les frontières des procédures de surveillance. Ce résultat n'est pas étonnant si l'on considère la lourder des mécanismes qui furent mis en place. Aucune plainte n'a donné lieu à des répercussions bénéfiques aux travailleurs des entreprises visées. Bref, il est clair que l'ANACT, dans sa forme actuelle, ne protège pas les droits fondamentaux des travailleurs et des travailleuses des trois pays.

De plus, nous constatons que les principaux mécanismes d'évaluation prévoient des interventions continuelles des ministres du travail concernés, ce qui mine sérieusement l'autonomie et la neutralité du processus de règlement des différends. En outre, une fois le processus enclenché, il n'y a pas de structures ou de mécanismes en place qui permettent aux groupes sociaux et syndicaux d'intervenir dans le volet « réparation » de l'ANACT, les parties impliquées ne se limitant qu'aux gouvernements intéressés.

Par ailleurs, la tenue d'audiences publiques constitue un important forum public de discussions sue les conditions de travail dans les trois pays. En mettant les violations de droits du travail à l'ordre du jour, cela suscite une plus grande transparence dans l'administration de la justice nationale. D'ailleurs, les règles administratives du bureau administratif national des Ètats-Unis relatives à l'analyse des plaintes prévoient la tenue d'audiences publiques.

Il est clair qu'au Mexique, la pression internationale sera un élément essentiel pour le respect et l'avancement des droits des travailleurs de ce pays. Ainsi, l'ANACT peut offrir l'espace politique nécessaire pour mettre sur la place publique leurs revendications et leurs batailles. Ainsi, les travailleurs et les travailleuses seront en mesure d'exercer plus librement leur droit d'association.

La FTQ estisme qu'il serait souhaitable que les BAN mexicain et canadien tiennent des audiences publiques afin de favoriser une plus grande transparence et sensibiliser la population aux enjeux du travail liés aux accords de libre-échange.

CONCLUSION

Quatre ans plus tard, force est de constater que les principales craintes énoncées par la FTQ à l'égard de l'ANACT se sont avérées vraies. L'ANACT est une entente « sans dents » qui croule sous les lourdeurs administratives. Hors du domaine très restreint dans lequel des sanctions peuvent être prises et pour lequel aucune plainte n'a encore été déposée, l'ANACT a eu à ce jour peu d'effet. L'expérience actuelle démontre plutôt que l'accord a été complètement inefficace pour protéger, voire améliorer, la protection des droits fondamentaux des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec et d'ailleurs.

Sur une note plus positive, nous constatons que l'ANACT a suscité la création d'alliances stratégiques entre les syndicats des trois pays. Ces liens privilégiés sont un gage d'évolution pour le mouvement syndical au Mexique et source d'une démocratie syndicale renouvelée dans ce pays.

À la FTQ nous croyons que nous devons décourager les stratégies de développement économique ne s'appuyant que sur les faibles coûts de main-d'oeuvre. Le défi de l'intégration économique sur le continent nord-américain réside dans une politique de développement socioéconomique qui nivelle « vers le haut ».

Syncrude Canada
J.E. Carter, President

Syncrude Canada Ltd. supports the objectives set out in Article 1 and Annex 1 of the NAALC and is satisfied that the Council of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, the Secretariat and the National Administration Offices have effectively promoted the objectives of the NAALC. I will explain why, using the framework of the objectives recorded in Article 1.

IMPROVE WORKING CONDITIONS AND LIVING STANDARDS

Our company believes that communities which have not historically participated in complicated economic enterprises benefit from the employment of their members by enterprises who are willing to invest the resources needed to give these workers the skills needed in a modern workplace. Syncrude Canada Ltd. is a leader in working with native communities in northern Alberta and is prepared to discuss its experience with other businesses.

PROMOTE LABOR PRINCIPLES LISTED IN ANNEX 1

Alberta was the first province to sign the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement. Syncrude Canada Ltd. carries on business in Alberta. It is reassuring to note that Alberta's Labor Relations Code grants workers for whom union representation is an issue the right to participate in a secret vote on the merits of union representation and establishes mechanisms to facilitate collective bargaining where workers wish it. Syncrude Canada has never opposed the right of workers to freely choose union representation.

Alberta legislation, such as the Employment Standards Code and the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act, demonstrates the province's commitment to the other values enshrined in Annex 1.

PROMOTION OF INNOVATION AND RISING LEVELS OF PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY

Syncrude Canada Ltd. recognizes the link between increased workforce productivity and income level. I am particularly pleased that in 1997 our company produced a record 207,000 barrels a day of synthetic light crude and current forecasts anticipate a 5.8% increase in output in 1998. Increased productivity, in our experience, has a direct relationship to worker income level.

Syncrude Canada Ltd. encourages its workforce to be innovative and is committed to reducing operating costs. This benefits all involved in the enterprise - investors and workers.

I am pleased that the Secretariat has decided to hold annual seminars on North American incomes and productivity.

INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING LABOR IN MEXICO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA

Syncrude Canada Ltd. supports the early initiatives of the three National Administrative Offices and the Secretariat of the Commission on Labor Cooperations to promote the publication of comparative studies on the labor laws of Mexico, United States and Canada. Works such as Comparative Labor Law Report will give readers valuable insights into the labor laws of other countries.

For the same reason, I think it was advisable to hold the three seminars on union registration in Mexico City, San Antonio and Monterrey in the last part of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996.

Canadian legislators sometimes support initiatives that are not used elsewhere in North America, seemingly without regard to the impact these measurers have on the business climate. For example, the federal government recently introduced proposed amendments to the Canada Labor Code, one of which was an effective ban on the use of replacement workers. Such a rule has no attractiveness in North America except in Quebec and British Columbia.

The Commission on Labor Cooperation may wish to encourage universities in each of the three states to consider forming alliances for the purpose of better disseminating information about these topics in each state.

COOPERATIVE LABOR RELATED

Syncrude Canada Ltd. is an experienced petroleum producer and is pleased to share its expertise. The study tour presented by the United States National Administrative in Orlando, Florida in October 1996 entitled "Preventing Catastrophic Explosions in the Petrochemical Industry in North America", provided an excellent forum for information exchanges. A Syncrude representative attended this study tour.

PROMOTION OF EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTE'S LABOR LAWS

The rule of law is one of the basic constitutional principles in Canada. Canadian institutions provide the mechanisms necessary for the effective implementation of the rule of law.

Syncrude Canada Ltd. is pleased that Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec have signed the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement and that Canada is now in a position to effectively participate in Part Four and Five proceedings under the NAALC.

FOSTER TRANSPARENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF LABOR LAW

Canadians assume that the administration of labor law is an open and understandable process. Labor law administrators routinely provide reasons for their decisions and there is a large body of precedent which those affected by a dispute may resort to. In addition, judicial review is also available in some situations.

Syncrude Canada Ltd. believes that it is important for the Canadian National Administrative office and the Secretariat to disseminate information to other states on how labor law in Canada is administered. This is why we propose that the Secretariat suggest to universities in Mexico, the United States and Canada that they establish programs which promote the exchange of information about each state's labor law and how it is administered. These programs may involve the exchange of scholars.

By way of summary, Syncrude Canada Ltd. supports the work of the Council, the Secretariat and the National Administrative offices and urges them to continue their educational programs.

United Nurses of Alberta
Heather Smith, President

During the negotiations for both the Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement, UNA took an active role in opposing these treaties for reasons outlined in a number of briefs and letters that we presented to both provincial and federal politicians. Primarily our opposition was centered on the negative effects these free trade agreements would have on Canada's health care system and on the rights of Canadian workers. We are now living through many of the severe and damaging effects that have resulted from an economic model of global integration.

This four-year review of the NAALC provides Canadians with an opportunity to critique the specific impact the free trade agreements have had on workers in all three countries as well as an opportunity to evaluate just how much effective the NAALC has been on ameliorating these effects.

We have contacted the Canadian Labour Congress and have received their submission to the review process. We concur with all the issues raised by the CLC and fully endorse their position.

In addition to the CLC's comments, we would like to register our very serious concerns regarding the disintegration that has occurred in health care since the signing of the FTA and the NAFTA. Specifically we are concerned about the rapid privatization of health care, particularly in Alberta and the unraveling of the Canada Health Act. Tremendous pressures are being exerted upon provincial governments to increase private, for-profit health care services and to reduce public services covered by provincial health care insurance plans.

The "harmonization" effects of the free trade agreements have been particularly negative on the quality and quantity of health care services in Alberta. Globalization has brought reduced services, the deinsuring of services, massive layoffs, wage rollbacks and the development of a two-tier health care system.

The effect on workers has been dramatic-large numbers of unemployed health care workers; chronically understaffed facilities; government-imposed wage rollbacks; increased numbers of stress-related illnesses; increased Workers' Compensation claims and disability claims; mounting levels of burnout; and the downward substitution of lesser-skilled workers to replace skilled professionals. These are the types of free trade effects that the NAALC was supposed to address and forestall. It has not.

As the CLC presentation points out, the effects on workers in Mexico are even more severe.

Rather than learn a lesson from these disastrous effects and curtail the massive economic globalization re-structuring in Canada, the federal government is now fully embroiled in negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. UNA opposes this initiative in that it will further harm workers; it will further reduce quality health care services; and it will reduce both the quality and quantity of our democratic rights.

United Nurses of Alberta fully supports the recommendations of the Canadian Labour Congress and urges the review process to integrate workers' rights and democratic rights into all further free trade agreements.

INDIVIDUALS

Gary Chambers
Alberta, Canada

Without extensive research, perhaps the best way to start explaining myself is through my personal experiences over the last twelve years.

About half of my time over the past twelve years has been spent in Europe, and the other half in Canada. I work in the publishing and broadcasting industries, usually in a journalistic or managerial capacity. This includes service as a director of small publishing companies on both continents. I think it is significant that in Europe I was seldom unemployed except by choice, and never relaint upon social safety nets, and I made about four times as much as I can in Canada. Since returning to Canada I have been out of work more often than I've been employed, and I have been dependent upon social programs more than once.

There are a number of things to which I can attribute this difference, but the main factor is the size of my market. In Europe I sold my services and products across the continent, without hindrance from, or even much involvement with bureaucracy. From a base on the south coast of England, I was able to conduct business with clients anywhere in Britain, without bothersome internal trade barriers. In short, my practical experience indicates that the European model of free trade between nations and internal economic regions, works well for those of us who labor at various levels within an industry. Since my return to Canada, E.E.C. restrictions on the movement and sale of individual labour services across Europe have been relaxed even further. In North America, however, I face a much more restricted and constricted market.

Within Canada, competition in mass media is strictly limited. The broadcasting industry in particular, is so heavily regulated that Canadians are not even free to subscribe to any Canadian broadcast service, let alone to foreign signals. A notable example is the situation of the Canadian cable TV movie channels, First Choice and Superchannel. Canadians in western Canada can be jailed for receiving First Choie on their TV sets, while eastern residents face the same threat if they are caught watching Superchannel. This is a very graphic example, but it is by no means the only indication of over-regulation. Another prime example is the continuing ban on advertising sales by local cable channels. This ban prevents the blossoming of an entire sub-branch of the television industry in Canada, which, if allowed to develop, would be capable of employing many thousands of people.

In both of the above examples, it is clear that the only reason these internal trade restrictions exist, is to protect the interests of huge corporations with powerful lobbying machines. These restrictions do nothing to increase overall competition and market size, nor do they enhance Canadian culture.

At a continental level, the N.A.F.T.A. is ultimately aimed at allowing the free movement of labour and its products across national boundaries. Ongoing restriction of this movement is supposed to allow the public and private sectors to adjust to a continental market, before starting the free movement of workers across borders. While this seems like a logical process, it can equally be argued that these restrictions, once again, benefit only the largest corporate interests within all three nations, while dooming smaller companies and individual workers to a type of regional labour bondage, which in turn legislates an ever deepening pit of poverty for the vast majority, and a non-competitive profiteering environment for the elite minority. At times it seems the true objective of the N.A.F.T.A.'s implementation schedule, is to make sure huge corporations get all the cream out of the free trade environment, before smaller entrepreneurs can get a look-in.

For my own part, I have attempted to press the limits of the agreement in my own small way. About a year ago I tried to launch an independent news service, supplying international news about N.A.F.T.A. to clients in both Canada and the U.S.A. Rather than offering the usual administrative and corporate trading news, I tried to concentrate on showing the potential effects of the N.A.F.T.A. on small firms and individual workers. While in part the failure of this enterprise may have been due to under-funding at my end, there is little doubt in my mind, that it was also due to the fact that only a small cross-section of people in both countries, see any relevance in N.A.F.T.A. where their own lives and businesses are concerned. In fact, many business owners and managers still seem to think that trading across borders for things that have traditionally been supplied only from domestic sources, poses a threat to national security or sovereignty. If these perceptions prevail in such culturally expansive markets as those for mass media products and services, I hate to imagine the kind of parochialism that must persist in even more protectionist industries, like agriculture and banking.

The European free trade laboratory has proven, that real progress will not begin until there is agreement on whether our continental trade regulations, will be aimed at ensuring the highest common benchmarks in such areas as environmental protection, labour standards, public health and so forth, or the lowest common benchmarks in these areas. This thorny question cannot be settled without hearing from the public as a whole. It is too often in the interests of the largest corporate bodies to gravitate to the lowest standards, because that situation usually results in lower operating overheads. If ordinary North Americans do not soon enter into this debate, the evolving nature of free continental trade will only reflect the wants and needs of the largest corporations, which in turn could lead to widespread dissatisfaction, unrest and perhaps even Ludite style resistance against free trade by individual workers.

Please keep in mind, that when considering the position of the individual worker with respect to N.A.F.T.A., we go beyond theoretical economic issues of production and commerce, and are at once forced to also consider more immediate practical questions of individual civil rights. That's what free trade is at the individual worker's level: a new civil right. For individual workers each new civil right acquired embodies another set of opportunities to generate new wealth, while civil rights withheld or denied, slam the doors on these opportunities.

In conclusion then, I appeal to the N.A.A.L.C. to begin taking whatever steps it can to create a much wider public awareness across North America, not just of the benefits that free trade offers for large corporate bodies, but also for smaller trading entities and particularly for individual workers. Only with this kind of knowledge can intelligent debate begin at the necessary grass roots levels.

Cindy DeSouza
University of Montreal

I am submitting to you a copy of my completed Master's thesis entitled "The Functioning of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation". Appropriately, the timing of my thesis submission at the Université de Montréal coincides with the four-year review of the NAALC requested by the Council of Labor Ministers as per Article 10(1) of the Agreement.

Please take note that the copy you are receiving has not been defended in front of the jury at the university. It has, however, been completely reviewed and finalized by Prof. Gilles Trudeau, my research director. The defense of the project is planned for late January or early February of 1998. It is predicted that no major changes to the text itself will be recommended by the jury. The decision to submit to you an undefended copy of the thesis was based on our desire to respond to your request for views and opinions of the Agreement's effectiveness by the December 31st deadline.

Michel Dion
University of Sherbrooke, Quebec

The "labor Principles" of NAALC follow from human rights standards that have been adopted within international conventions signed by many international organizations (for instance ILO, OECD). The parallel development of MERCOSUR and NAFTA could create the possibility of FTAA at the beginning of 21st century. While NAFTA has a labor agreement (NAALC), MERCOSUR has no such agreement. The creation of FTAA could happen through the negotiation between two economics blocks (MERCOSUR for South America and NAFTA for North America). It could also happen that NAFTA includes other South American Countries, like Argentina and Chile. In both cases, the question of human rights in the workplace will remain unanswered. Moreover, during such a complex political process, many ethical dilemmas happen between NAFTA partners and with South American partners. The "Labor Principles" of NAALC should constitute the first platform for the discussing ethical issues in an eventual FTAA. However, we should take the opportunity to improve such principles to widen their scope.

Widening the Scope of Labor Principle

I recommend:

1. To replace the title of the "Annex 1" by the following one: "A General Statement about Ethical Issues Between NAFTA Partners."
2. To define some core values that NAFTA are encouraged to pursue in their business operations and transactions: dignity, openness, honesty, fairness, social justice, equality and mutual respect. Such values would become the first part of the General Statement;
3. To keep the "Labor Principles" of NAALC within such a General Statement (second part);
4. To include a specific part about the ways Partners would promote and facilitate international cooperation in fighting corruption in the international business;
5. To include an "indirect" monitoring system (for the "General Statement", managed by the Labor Secretariat.

The review process of NAALC, as to the "Labor Principles", should give both to an international seminar (for researchers and business leaders) about ethical issues between NAFTA Partners. It could give a better idea of the complexity of the ethical dilemmas paced by business corporations in USA, Canada or Mexico. And such a reflection of the economic realities could give rise to relevant suggestions. Mostly, it could say, how the scope of the "Labor Principles", should be widen.

Christine Elwell
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

Part 1 NAALC Implementation Process

This review of the implementation process is intended to set out a contextual window from which to view the specific discussion that follows on NAALC procedures and outcomes. Reference is made to some NAFTA impacts, including the continuing "democratic deficit" in North America as economic integration proceeds. The most recent negotiations over a Multinational Investment Agreement seem to add to further public insecurity about global forces beyond its control. This insecurity about the public interest aspects of these negotiations is further exacerbated by the concerns raised in the recent Industry Canada study indicating that the vast majority of foreign investment in Canada is directed at acquisitions and mergers, resulting in job loss, and not job creation.¹ This seeming inability of governments and the institutions they create to represent the public interest in these economic developments is startling for many people.

Moreover, the relationship, or more properly the lack thereof, between and among the NAALC, NAFTA and the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) institutions is highlighted so as to suggest that unequal implementation has so far prevented the NAALC from fulfilling fully, perhaps impossible, public expectations. Hopefully a regional approach to the better integration of social and economic objectives will be more achievable at the forthcoming Santiago Summit for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). In any case, the three NAFTA institutions and how they evolve, remain an important global model of regional integration and law creation.

1.1 NAFTA Impacts

On the positive side, it is widely believed that the North American Free Trade Agreement ² and the sunshine effect of its side agreements on labour and environmental cooperation have contributed to an unprecedented level of scrutiny of the law and practice of the NAFTA parties. This has allowed for a process of review and public discussion that contributes, in some important ways to debates occurring within our respective societies.

Indeed the labour side agreement, the NAALC, was heralded as a new breed of trade agreement that recognized in the North and in the South that our "mutual prosperity depends upon the promotion of competition based on innovation and rising levels of productivity"³. Free trade was not at any cost and so, to this end, the NAALC contained trade and other monetary mechanisms to ensure a high level of mutually recognized labour principles.

1.2 North American Trade and Investment Flows Matter

Generally speaking, however, the implementation process of the NAALC, in contrast to the Agreement itself, tends to avoid direct discussions about North American trade and investment flows and how these economic activities impact on plant location decisions, labour markets and workers' rights. Recall that the NAFTA parties, in their preambular promise to improve working conditions and living standards, recognize the need to proceed with free trade only in a manner that was consistent with the protection of workers' rights and the environment, in order to achieve sustainable development. Understanding the tensions of balancing market forces with these protections, the objectives of the NAFTA include a direct reference to the promoting of "fair competition". An example of balancing market forces is found in Article 104 where certain international environmental agreements take precedence over the NAFTA to the extent of the inconsistency. Also, the Investment Chapter provides for consultations to deal with the recognized inappropriateness of lowering health, safety or environmental measures in order to attract investment (Article 1114). In addition to these specific matters of trade, workers' rights, and the environment, as with all international agreements generally, the NAFTA and the NAALC are to be interpreted and applied in accordance with international law, a constantly evolving process of norm creation, law and practice. It is by these expectations that NAFTA impacts and NAALC effectiveness must be evaluated.

In order to make such evaluations, however, objective indicators must be made publicly available. Despite attempts at empirical research, so far NAALC operations tend to deny or at least avoid the relevance of data collection strategies regarding trade and investment matters. In other words, the NAALC institutions should collect and analyze data regarding trade and investment laws and practice that have a bearing on labour markets and workers' rights. Such factual information might indicate the existence and extent of trade-related labour impacts, issues and interests. In light of the examples offered below, this general observation seems to be true regarding both its work with stakeholders as well as with other NAFTA Institutions. Perhaps expecting this level of analysis is unrealistic at this point in time but its obvious absence brings the credibility of the NAALC process and its effectiveness into serious question. One need only refer to the inability of the current US administration to obtain fast track authority from the Congress in order to recall that trade liberalization is not successful without a meaningful social dimension.

1.3 Incorporation of Side Agreements by Reference in NAFTA

One of the repeated suggestions is to incorporate the side agreements by direct reference into the main trade agreement. Given that the side agreements were negotiated after the NAFTA, a specific reference to them at the earliest possible renegotiation of the NAFTA, would help alleviate the concerns that their status is in political jeopardy. As an interim measure, in addition to the budgetary recommendations at paragraph 1.6, the NAFTA parties could add the side agreements by way of Article 104 of the NAFTA listing the priority of specific international environmental agreements over inconsistent NAFTA provisions. Because this list may be added to without the necessity of an amendment to the NAFTA itself, it would not be necessary to take the matter directly to the national legislatures. Assuming that the labour side agreement is a type of international environmental agreement recognized within the meaning of Article 104, an appropriately drafted executive agreement by the NAFTA parties might accomplish the same end as a direct amendment to NAFTA.

Recommendation: Given that the side agreements on labour and environmental cooperation were negotiated after the NAFTA, the specific incorporation by direct reference to them in the main trade agreement, at the earliest possible renegotiation of the NAFTA, would help to alleviate the concerns that their status is in political jeopardy. As an interim measure, in addition to the budgetary recommendations at paragraph 1.6, the NAFTA parties could add the side agreements by way of an executive agreement to Article 104 of the NAFTA where certain international environmental agreements are listed as taking precedence over the NAFTA to the extent of the inconsistency.

In light of this negotiating history and the examples offered below, the general observation that the NAALC implementation process has avoided direct reference to trade and investment flows seems to be true regarding both its work with stakeholders as well as with other NAFTA Institutions.

1.4 Stakeholder Example of Trade Avoidance

None of the otherwise useful cooperative work programs or public submission activities have dealt directly with trade-related matters. For example, in the Secretariat's Plant Closing study only made indirect reference to NAFTA impacts; plant closing trends were mentioned in terms of "the New North American reality". Rather than dealing directly with the issues related to the migration of industries and services to low wage, non-union or sweetheart deal jurisdictions, the focus of these early activities and studies tends to be limited to comparative research on domestic labour laws and enforcement rather than the transnational effects of varying standards and enforcement, that can result in distortions of competition, however defined.

Even the Secretariat's study on North American Labour Markets which promised to deal with themes that transcend national borders, focussed on a profile of individual labour market indicators, without identifying the overall push and pull effects of these indicators on country specific and North American labour markets and workers' rights. Perhaps the annual workshop on North American Labour Markets will reveal additional data. The underlying driving force behind business synergies and reorganizations in North America, as envisioned in the NAFTA with its guarantee of market access largely free from tariff, content and other traditional investment requirements is more or less unaccounted for in NACLC operations. Why is this? Wasn't the NAALC designed to be a link between economic (environment) and social policy?

It is not as if empirical data is unavailable to reveal what the general North American public already knows: in the absence of high North American-wide norms, job loss and threats thereof in high standard jurisdictions to low cost locations tend to place a downward pressure on those high standards and their enforcement, resulting in a harmonized, but now lower, common dominator within the free trade area. When this impact is combined with the knowledge, real or perceived, that the shift has not resulted in improvements for the low-cost jurisdiction, the public interest concerns about economic integration are reinforced. The so-called social dumping effect of North American trade has been experienced since 1988 for Canadians when faced with the first Canada-US Free Trade Agreement with the US and, since 1994 for Americans when faced with its extension to Mexico in the NAFTA. Even Mexicans will admit of their fears of capital flight to lower standard jurisdictions South and West. But is the NAALC equipped to identify and address these inappropriate effects?

The then Canadian Minister of International Trade, Tom Hockins, in a statement announcing the establishment of the NAFTA and the side agreements promised that: "The side agreements will provide the positive assurance that the three NAFTA parties will enforce environmental and labour laws so that no country gains an unfair competitive advantage". Benard Valcourt, the then Canadian Minister of Labour, proclaimed that: "The (NAALC) agreement provides an open window on labour market aspects of trade between Canada, the US and Mexico".

Yet ten years later Canadians are still experiencing aspects of social dumping. At the end of January, 1998 another US based multinational firm, Black & Decker, closed its operations in Ontario and shifting production to North Carolina and Maryland, the former being a so-called right to work state, with low standards and a non-union ethos. Custom Trim Ltd. of Waterloo, Ontario plans to lay off 432 workers in April by shifting production to Mexico. Did the fact that workers at the Ontario plant earn $12 an hour, while the Mexican plant pays less than a $1 an hour have anything to do with that relocation decision?⁴ Huge job losses are also anticipated with the merger of Canadian banks to compete in the new global financial services markets. If these social impacts are not accounted for within an economic context and addressed in public forums, then the governments of today must be in denial about the relevance of trade, even though these effects were recognized as a real possible threat to trade liberalization when the NAFTA and the NAALC were negotiated.

Because of the political reluctance to deal with this "new North American reality", North Americans are effectively unable to enjoy the promises of the NAFTA and the NAALC. People are not able to participate meaningfully in and have their concerns considered by the very institutions and processes that significantly shape their lives. No North American could possibly afford in time or money to attend all, or even a sufficient number, of the various workshops and public forums sponsored by the NAALC institutions, across this vast continent. The Europeans described this problem as the "Democratic Deficit"; addressed by establishing an increasingly important European Parliament so that citizens could at least elect representatives to the various European forums. While this solution does not appear likely in North America, a more purposeful gathering of trade-related information by the NAALC Secretariat, together with intervener funding would better inform the public and decision-makers about this major gap in research and policy direction.

Recommendation: That the NAALC Secretariat should develop a screening mechanism for both its cooperative activities and dispute settlement procedures to specifically identify and publicly record any related trade or investment laws and practices, both domestic and relating to the NAFTA, that would contribute to understanding the economic background to that activity, comparative study or dispute.

1.5 NAFTA Institutions and Committees Matter

A related problem in the area of NAALC Implementation is that the Secretariat is unable to exert much influence in the main trade arenas, partly because it lacks the necessary background information and analysis. The NAALC as an institution, despite its best efforts, has been unable to give a voice to social policy concerns in NAFTA institutions, including its almost 50 subcommittees, let alone integrate decision making and cooperation with them.

Indeed the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NAECE) in its recent Review of NAFTA Institutions promoted the idea of further cooperation between the NACEC and the NAFTA bodies, including meetings of North American trade and environment ministers. One of the reasons given against the idea is the fear in the trade community that such contact "would create pressure for a parallel meeting with labour ministers where a shared agenda and interests are far less clear" (p24). The implicit message here is that North American labour ministers and institutions have not articulated a clear trade-related agenda for policy development. Moreover they risk being further shut out of on-going NAFTA and NACEC processes, despite many inter-related issues and interests.

One example of possible joint action is the work of the NAFTA Subcommittee on Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods (Annex 913.5.a-4). The NAALC is undertaking a study and possible work program about the labour conditions in the North America apparel industry, that might result in a sector specific code of conduct. Surely one of the enforcement options available is a social labelling scheme. Would not this initiative be informed by the work of the related NAFTA Subcommittee?

Another opportunity for integration and cooperation is to work jointly with the trilateral NAFTA Working Group on Pesticides. This group is working with the NAECE to harmonize a pesticide registry and the establishment of limits on residues. Implementation projects include: data requirements, worker exposure, acute toxicity, biopesticides, minor use, reregistration/reevaluation, fish farming, spray drift, integrated pest management, and good laboratory practices. It is interesting to note that with respect to non-registered pesticides, the US requires non-dectable limits, refusing the entry of goods with any dectable amount. Canada has a general tolerance of 0.1 parts per million. Mexico appears to have no limits.

This example of a joint program may result in the upward harmonization of standards. In any event, this initiative would no doubt be improved by NACLC-related expertise with respect to common workplace issues and interests. Moreover, the NACLC and the national offices would no doubt benefit by considering the current scientific data pointing to the urgency of protecting workplaces, particularly in non-union facilities, from inappropriate chemical use in the process and production methods of goods and services.⁵ This observation is especially true given the most recent US NAO Submissions regarding Han Young and Echlin. Because there is an issue related to workplace health and safety, as well as freedom of association and collective bargaining, the submissions are eligible for the appointment of an independent Evaluation Committee of Experts, even under current procedural NAALC guarantees. That Committee could conduct its own comparative analysis, reports and recommendations as well as connect with the NACEC. It is noteworthy that the Echlin submission about a US autoparts multinational in Mexico was, for the first time file by, inter alia, certain Canadian unions.

Recommendation: That the NAALC Secretariat develop a work program to monitor and publicly report upon all NAACE and all NAFTA-related committees and working groups with significant impacts on North America labour market, standards and workers rights. The success of this initiative would depend upon not only the cooperation of the North American governments and the NAECE but also the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.

That the NAALC Secretariat also develop a program to establish a Code of Conduct in the North American apparel industry that includes the following features: customer-related social labelling and independent monitoring of compliance with the code. This initiative would be informed by the work of the NAFTA Subcommittee on Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods. As an interim measure, the Secretariat might act as the monitoring body, augmented with a public submission process regarding specific compliance concerns.

1.6 Unequal Implementation Matters

Perhaps the most obvious solution to these implementation problems and the apparent inability to deal directly with trade matters is to better equip the NAALC Secretariat both financially and with additional trade-related expertise. Compare the budgets of the NACLC with the NACEC. The NAALC has an annual budget of US $2 million, with a staff of 15 employees. The NAACE has an annual budget of US $9 million, with a staff more than twice as large! As a result of that kind of support, the NAACE is better able to deliver more relevant fact finding reports, bring in outside experts to provide independent views, and provide for public communications and the distribution of documents. Why the distinction? If human beings are the central concern of sustainable development (1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 1) it is clearly unsustainable to treat the social and environmental aspects of development so unequally. The labour side agreement is and must be seen to be, integral to environmentally sound North American trade and investment.

It should be noted that both institutions suffer from being exposed to annual line items vetos in the US Congress, which is both destabilizing and distracting.

Recommendation That the NAALC institutions budget and staff match that of the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation and that both budgets be guaranteed for five years with indexed funding by the three governments, with provision made for some intervener funding, augmented by the corporations taking advantage of synergistic benefits from economies of scale and scope because of North American trade and investment.

That the NAFTA institutions, including the NAALC and the NAECE, address the growing public perception that they have no means of ensuring local political accountability or democratic control over the increasing integration of the North American economy. This inability to actually participate in and influence the outcome of NAFTA processes, or the so-called democratic deficit, would be relieved somewhat if intervener funding were provided, in order for individuals and groups to join in representative submissions and appear at public forums. Serious consideration might also be given to establishing some type of elected public forum to more directly represent the public interest in North American institutions.

Part Two Matters of Procedure

Recognizing the political unlikelihood that the NAFTA or the side agreements will be amended in the near term, improvements in the procedural processes of the institutions could act as a surrogate for substantive reform as an interim measure. One of the ways to accomplish this end would be to interpret and apply the NAALC in the future so that the layers of dispute resolution treatment are made more administratively manageable and responsive to the needs of the stakeholders.

It is important for the transparency of the process that there be more opportunity for an independent evaluation of the comparative data that is collected by NAALC institutions in proceedings under the NAALC. As Steven Herzenberg points out, by permitting labour rights matters to be considered by an independent Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECEs), the Secretariat would be able to act on acquired knowledge without forcing it to be the originator of reports or ideas that "push the envelop".⁶ Recall that the NAALC Annex lists eleven labour principles with different treatment accorded to them in the dispute settlement process. Workers' associational rights have no access to ECEs, unlike technical labour standards, such as matters of overtime pay. Yet as a matter of fact all of the cases so far submitted under the NAALC, except the recent submission about pregnancy testing⁷ have dealt with the first principles - freedom of association and protection of the right to collective bargaining; matters not currently eligible for a referral to an independent ECE. This 1994 legal distinction appears artificial compared to the real life workplace situations raised so far with the NAACL institutions and where significant trade-impacts have been experienced by people. No cases have reached dispute resolution by an arbitral panel, that could lead to trade or other monetary enforcement measures.

One way to improve this situation, short of amendment, is by modifying NAALC procedures. For example it should be possible to find that the current eight technical categories of labour principles that may be referred to an ECE - when the earlier level of Ministerial consultations have failed to resolve a proceeding - have been merged or collapsed with the remaining labour principles, so that data on all of NAALC's recognized labour principles are open to an independent review.

I have argued elsewhere that the 1994 proviso in the NAALC stating that the labour principles listed in the Annex do not establish any "common minimum standards" has been modified by the 1996 Singapore Declaration "reaffirming internationally recognized core labour standards" of the World Trade Organization, the successor to the GATT, and the expected 1998 ILO Solemn Declaration of universal labour principles.⁸ Given the agreement of an acquiescence by the NAFTA parties in these other forums, and in order to be consistent with the evolving nature of international law, it could now be said that the NAFTA parties do recognize as common labour principles those related to: freedom of association, collective bargaining, non-discrimination, forced labour and minimum employment age. If this interpretation is accepted, say in the terms of reference in the next NAALC proceeding, it follows that the distinction about which principles can proceed to an ECE review may be no longer necessary or current given these important political and legal developments since that NAALC was negotiated. At the very least, these agreements require a consistent interpretation.

Recommendation: That the NAALC institutions take notice of the political and legal developments at other international forums, including at the WTO and the ILO, recognizing common internationally recognized core labour standards. It follows that the NAALC, as well as proceedings under it, be interpreted and applied so as be consistent with these developments, including the collapse of which NAALC labour principles may proceed to an independent Evaluation Committee of Experts.

Part Three NAALC Outcomes

In 1997 the United States executive branch of government completed a three year Review on the Operation and Effects of the NAFTA as required under section 512 of the US NAFTA Implementation Act. Whether the NAFTA contributed to net job gains or losses is a matter of dispute. ⁹ What the Study did make clear, however, is that "in industries such as autos, chemicals, textiles and electronics, NAFTA is permitting American companies to achieve synergies across the North American market". This acknowledgement of the move to consolidate North American business is further proof of the trade-relatedness of workers' rights and structural adjustment issues, as set out above in part one of this submission.

The question now turns to whether these trade impacts have been adequately addressed, particularly by the NAALC public submission process. While a full review of the details of the NAALC public submissions treatment is not provided herein, some general observations about the cases so far are offered. In addition, two major concerns relating to individual remedies and the administration of justice are highlighted because these concerns may be contributing to the current inability of NAALC institutions to deal directly with recognized trade issues and interests.

3.1 NAALC Public Submissions

Within this economic context, the US Study referred to above also considered NAALC operations and effects. As with all reviews, it found that the cooperative activities have lead to public debate on key labour matters and that the public submission process has resulted in transparency and action plans to address concerns. Specific attention was drawn to the outcome of the Maxi-Switch case where as a result of the NAALC process, the recognition of an independent union not previously recognized by the Mexican State of Sonora's Conciliation and Arbitration Board became available.¹⁰ Note was also made of secret ballots at two companies in Mexico where union election votes had previously been monitored.¹¹ To this list one might also add the withdrawal of labour legislation in the Province of Alberta that would have privatized the enforcement of employment standards. The Canadian Labour Lawyers Association threatened to file a complaint with the NAALC, alleging a competitive advantage in terms of trade if the Province failed to retain effective control to ensure workers rights.

It is interesting to observe that beginning with the Maxi-Switch case, public submissions have begun to focus not only on issues around enforcement of domestic labour law but also on the obligations contained in the NAALC itself.¹² This development is proceeding in spite of the political claim at the time that the NAALC was only about enforcing one's own domestic law. Given this experience, it appears that transnational substantive and process-related claims, as well as further public expectations may have been irrevocably created.

3.2 Providing Individual Remedies Does Matter

World experts have been discussing strategies for reining in impunity for human rights violations within the context of establishing an International Criminal Court.¹³ Among the policy considerations are mechanisms of accountability for serious violations of fundamental human rights and the role of pardons at both the national and international levels. Shared by all participants is the general assumption that justice should not be a bargaining chip to political settlements anymore.

Despite these developments, the NAALC, as currently structured, does not provide for individual access to it, unlike the individual's right to directly petition the NACEC under its Article 13 and 14 public submission procedures. Individuals must convince their respective National Administrative Office to take their case to the NACLC. So despite a finding of a persistent pattern of failure by a NAFTA government to enforce its own labour laws, often entailing fundamental human rights, the NAALC by design institutionalizes a type of immunity for governments from providing effective individual remedies for the breach of fundamental rights recognized by domestic law and the NAALC.

Recognizing the positive aspects of the NAALC process as reviewed by the US executive above, it must be stressed that unfortunately, most of the public submission cases have not resulted in any measurable improvements in the lives of the workers concerned. To explain this result, one could refer to technical provisions of the NAALC.¹⁴ One of them is ironically listed under the heading of Procedural Fairness at Article 5(8) specifying that: decisions by each Party's administrative or labour tribunals shall not be subject to revision or reopened under any provision of the NAALC. So while a restrictive interpretation about individual remedies may be true, the expectations of the people, based in part on the promises held out to them about the NAALC, are far more grand.

The first five NAALC cases at Honeywell, General Electric, Sony, Sprint and Maxi-Switch largely concerning the dismissal of workers as a result of their efforts to organize an independent union, did not lead to the reinstatement of the workers. Moreover, despite the sunshine, the failure of the Mexican Federal and state Conciliation and Arbitration Boards to consistently register independent unions for election and representation purposes, particularly in the maquiladoras sector, continues to appear as a deliberate strategy on behalf of the Mexican government, together with multinational businesses, to prevent workers from bargaining for a reasonable share of the benefits of the fast growing export sector and, at the same time, placing downward pressure on the standards and wages in the North.¹⁵ This has been the disturbing trend despite the NAALC's preambular promise to "promote higher living standards as productivity increases". It is respectfully submitted that this trend or pattern speaks to an inappropriate distortion of North American competition and labour markets, contrary to the NAFTA objectives.

At the very least the NAALC institutions might exercise their public interest mandate and suggest, in particular cases, what the likely individual remedy would be with reference to North American norms. Otherwise the NAALC's current restrictions against individual access to the NAALC, and the reopening of a domestic case or a private right of action in light of a NAALC proceeding, require an amendment to the Agreement in order to reverse this unusual dispute resolution gap by design. Given the justified sensitivities of the South that the NAALC process has tended to focus on exposing the internal challenges of developing countries¹⁶, this author has advocated that future public submissions also concentrate on the problem of economic burden shifting between developed countries, that is the US and Canada¹⁷. With the agreement of the provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec to participate in the NAALC process¹⁸, and the growing interest in Canadian civil society to work with North American partners at these forums, perhaps the sunshine will become more widespread.

Recommendation: That the NAALC be amended to permit individual access to it as is the case with the NAAEC, and that the reopening of a domestic case or a private right of action in light of a NAALC proceeding be permitted to reverse the institutionalized immunity for NAFTA governments from processes respecting violations of fundamental human rights. Even without an amendment to the Agreement, the NAALC institutions currently have the discretion in particular public submissions to indicate in a deliberate way, what the individual remedy would be by reference to North American norms.

3.4 The Timely Administration of Justice Matters

Not only has the NAALC been designed to prohibit the provision of individual remedies, its operations tend to shy away from the more difficult, often systemic administration of justice concerns, that also have a great impact on the ability of workers to actually enjoy their substantive rights as well as contributing to distortions of competition in North American labour markets.

Consider the Sprint case. Recall that this public submission resulted in ministerial consultations initiated for the first time by the Mexican NAO in 1995 about the US system of labour law enforcement, prompted by the sudden closing by the Sprint Corporation in San Francisco immediately prior to a union election. The Commission engaged in a helpful process in collecting comparative data on the domestic law of each country respecting plant closures during a union election campaign. The trinational, indeed tripartite study of academics and union and employer representatives, made important findings with respect to enforcement practices. Based on that study the Commission was able to say that all parties effectively enforced their law on the subject. Nevertheless the study largely by-passed a critical issue in the original submission to the Mexican NAO, on the matter of excessive delays and layers of judicial process under the US National Labour Relations Act.

Generally speaking it can take up to 3 years under the US system to obtain a remedy from the National Labour Relations Board, as well as an additional couple of years of appeals before there is enforcement of a Board order. Any industrial relations observer knows that the drive for a successful union election would be long over by then. In contrast, and buried in the study's fine print, it appears that the Canadian system of labour law administration on average provides for a fast track remedy to employees when faced with the threat of plant closure during a union organizing campaign in about 35 days.

3.5 Institutional Decline and Economic Burden Shifting Matters

Canadians have been concerned about the persistent decline in US labour law institutions for some time. A 1983 study by Professor Weiler called American labour law "an elegant tombstone for a dying institution¹⁹. He found that at least one worker in 20 was fired for voting for a union, rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law a half-century ago. Only one newly-organized union in five go on to successfully negotiate a first collective agreement, because of a wide variety of legal and illegal tactics available to employers. But the delays at the National Labour Relations Board of up to three years for a union to obtain an unfair labour practice order is not uncommon, allowing employers ample time to coerce employees to reject a union.

Weiler states that "the core of the legal structure must bear a major share of the blame for providing employers with the opportunity and the incentives to use these tactics, which have had such a chilling effect on worker interest in trade unions". The remedies administered by the Board "cannot" stem the "astronomical increase" of employer unfair labour practices. The failure of the system to prevent unfair practices is generally attributed to the weakness of the sanctions for even the crudest forms of retaliation against union supporters.

The NAALC labour principles on the right to organize and procedural fairness are based upon ILO commitments²⁰. Article 1 of ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively provides that: "Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect to their employment". The ILO has emphasized the necessity of providing an expeditious, inexpensive and impartial means of redressing grievances caused by anti-union conduct listed under Article 1.

Evan Potter, US Council for International Business admits that if the US were to ratify Convention 98 the substantial delays at the National Labour Relations Board "could result in the US being subject to criticism or being found to be out of compliance for failing to treat those cases expeditiously".²¹ Potter concludes that: "Ratification of the ILO conventions by the US, not only creates an international obligation, but are also incorporated into domestic law, superseding prior inconsistent federal and state statutes". Potter admits that the result would be: "to change state law and practice by Federal action thought the ratification of ILO Conventions." Has not the same result occurred by virtue of the NAALC?

According to a study by Lawrence Katz, chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labour, and Richard Freeman of Harvard University unionised workers in the US enjoy wage rates 20-25% above those in non-union plants. The decline in union membership may have accounted for as much as a fifth of the total rise in wage inequality experienced in the US since the 1980's, unprecedented in postwar US history and without parallel in other advanced economies.²² Yet all industrialized countries, the authors remark, have had to cope with the same structural changes, such as the shift from manufacturing to services and stiffer competition from low-wage producers in the developing countries.

Could it not be said that the decline of US labor institutions is an attempt at international economic burden shifting, giving the new non-union model of US business management a 20-25% cost of savings compared with a like Canadian, union made product or provided service? Given these unfair competitive pressures, how long will it be before the Canadian system of administration plummets down the same slope of institutional decline?

The concern raised in the Sprint submission touches the failure to administer justice in an effective and timely manner. It is about the general decline of the state as guarantor of an employees' choice to unionize free from coercion and of good faith bargaining between employers and independent trade unions. Without this guarantee of a timely remedy, when rights are infringed, workers are not effectively able to enjoy the labour principles recognized in the NAALC. A more purposeful gathering of information by the Commission related to persistent patterns of failure to provide timely domestic remedies would be helpful. There is precedent for the recommendation below. In the Sony case the US NAO utilized information obtained in the proceeding Honeywell and GE cases to evaluate the Sony complaint about difficulties in registering independent unions in Mexico.

Recommendation that the Commission maintain a record of findings related to a pattern of a persistent failure of a NAFTA party to provide expeditious administrative procedures to remedy unfair labour practices. Where the record indicates that at least two such findings have been made with respect to a party, the Commission should give public notice to this effect and submit a proposed action plan for the Council of Ministers to consider at its next regular meeting.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this review, it must be emphasized that it is still relatively early to evaluate objectively the effectiveness of the NAALC in avoiding or mitigating the recognized negative trade impacts on workers' rights and labour standards. With more equal efforts by the NAFTA parties to implement the promises in the NAFTA and the NAALC, particularly in the areas of funding, procedural fairness and individual access to timely remedies, the hope of providing a world class model of regional development remains. The NAFTA parties should clarify at the first available opportunity the integral nature of the side agreements on labour and environmental cooperation by incorporating them by direct reference in an amended NAFTA, or by way of an executive agreement.

The NAALC institutions, despite best efforts, needs to be ever diligent in exercising the public interest mandate it already enjoys. A more comprehensive approach to data collection and analysis, particularly relating to trade impacts and persistent patterns of practice respecting labour law administration would also be welcome. Finally, finding opportunities to creatively push the envelope on procedural questions such as the legal consequences that follow from political developments at other international forums will no doubt become increasingly available and expected.

Ozay Mehmet
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario

Introduction

The North American Agreement on Labour Co-operation (NAALC), which came into force in January 1994, is a pioneering example of linking regional free trade arrangements with labour co-operation in industrial relations and worker rights. Although NAALC is a "side" agreement, rather than an integral part of the NAFTA treaty, it is significant as a trend-setter and model for other trade agreements progressive enough to aim at promoting better labour standards and working conditions along with trade.

However, NAALC is not a perfect instrument, and the purpose of this brief note is to make a few preliminary suggestions, in the context of the Art. 10 review process, for further strengthening and improving the NAALC regime. This input is the result of an ongoing project at FOCAL on labour migration and worker rights, sponsored by CIDA and the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, to be completed by 31 March 1997, at which time a fuller report will be prepared.

Trade, Worker Rights and Labour Standards Trade

NAALC refers in Annex I to common "Labor Principles" which, while respecting each member State's domestic labour laws, commits each of the Parties to promote these common principles. While these common principles do not explicitly refer to the international labour standards adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the 11 principles are remarkably consistent with ILO's core standards. Therefore, it would appear that the NAALC regime addresses, at least at this stage of NAFTA's evolution, the concern that state agreement to minimum international labour standards is largely irrelevant if there is little likelihood that these standards will be enforced.

Agreements to promote trade and labour standards will be easier to come to and more stable when they meet each state's sovereignty concerns while also meeting the concern of many states, particularly the industrialized countries, that clearer and stronger rules of the game are required concerning the role of labour standards in trade (developing countries that wish to improve their labour standards but are concerned about losing comparative advantage, regardless of the realities of this situation, also benefit).

For these reasons, it is not surprising and significant that the ILO has recognized that NAALC as the most interesting current example of a social clause because it is a multiparty agreement and involves a North-South dimension.

Critical Appraisal of NAALC

However, there are many criticisms of the NAALC that should be addressed in order to strengthen the NAALC and/or in using it as a model for other regional trade arrangements. Beyond the debate over whether minimum international labour standards are required, there is criticism that the complaints process militates against transparency and natural justice as complainants are unable to bring complaints directly to the Labour Secretariat. Instead they have to work through a complex and lengthy review by the appropriate National Administrative Office (NAO) and other bodies. Thus, in the Sprint plant closure which occurred in 1994, the Council of Ministers requested, under Art. 14, the Commission to undertake a study which took a further year to complete and publish; in the meantime, after three years of legal review, the case is still (December 1997) pending.

The slow moving legal process stands in sharp contrast to the direct access to the dispute settlement panels under NAFTA and even the direct access to arbitral panels by environmental activists under the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-operation. Trade measures are only resorted to if the complainant can demonstrate in the various stages of the review process if there has been a persistent violation of domestic laws, that both countries recognize, and then only in the areas of health and safety, child labour and setting minimum wage. It is puzzling that under NAALC these standards are different than the core labour standards the ILO has singled out as central to the trade context, including freedom of association and forced labour. Freedom of association complaints can only go as far as consultations and an obligation to report. Any remedy can only be sought under national law. To overcome this limitation, the following two specific suggestions can be made:

1. Firstly, ratification of core ILO Conventions in Canada and the USA are essential to provide a minimum floor of "best practice" principles. Annex I of NAALC provide 11 principles, but they must be made binding under national law and for that ratification of the minimum "core" are an essential first step. The minimum 5 "core" ILO standards are: (1) Convention 87 on freedom of association, (2) Convention 98 on the right to collective bargaining, (3) Convention 105 on abolition of forced labour, (4) Convention 111 on non-discrimination, and (5) Convention 138 on minimum age to protect children. Conventions on health and safety in the work-place and employment policy are also sometimes included in the definition of "core" standards.

   What is the position in Canada, the USA and Mexico? Canada has not ratified #98 and #138. The US has ratified only #105. Mexico has ratified more than both Canada and the USA, but, of course, lags in application and administrative efficiency. The ability of the Northern Parties to enhance Mexican efficiency in this respect is a function of harmonization of industrial relations law and practice. Harmonization of industrial relations law and practice should logically follow ratification of minimum core standards in Canada and the USA as outlined above.

2. The second important action which the Canadian NAO should undertake is a program of public information and consultation process based on participatory research. At the present time the level of knowledge amongst Canadians of the provisions of NAALC is minimal or virtually non-existent. While generally the Canadian public is aware of the labour problems in international trade, for example child poverty and exploitation of children in "sweatshops" in the Third World, more informed public on NAALC issues is essential to generate consensus for progressive action and reform as part of Canadian foreign policy.